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Abstract 
"International Non-Governmental Organizations and the Business of Development: 
An examination of the Third-Sector's Programming Value in Zambia" 
By Glenn R. Shaw 
Numerous researchers have suggested that international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) remain inherently valuable to human development 
programming, yet some theorists express real concerns about many organizations' 
developmental usefulness. Guided by the hypothesis that INGOs do add value to 
development initiatives, but at a potential cost to their own autonomy, this study 
evaluates the donor/INGO relationship in Zambia between the Swedish development 
agency SID A and their partner Diakona, as well as the comparable relationship 
between USAID and their respective partner PACT. 
The study further inquires how development programming might be transformed or 
revised as a result of these relationships, and notes differences which exist between 
the donor's behaviour when dealing with INGOs, and whether these differences 
make for a more successful programming environment. Ultimately, the study finds 
that INGOs indeed add value, but can be, at times, influenced or even detrimental to 
development initiatives if not appropriately managed. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction & Methodology 
4 
' 7 have owed you this letter for a very long time -but my fingers have avoided the pencil 
as though it were an old and poisoned tool. " 
- John Steinbeck, Letter to his literary agent, found on his desk after his death in 1968 
"He who wished to secure the good of others, has already secured his own ". - Confucius 
Introduction 
Billions of dollars in western resources are spent on international development initiatives 
every year. These initiatives target developing countries in order to assist in improving 
living standards. However, a widely shared perception exists that since development 
programming first began in 1949 living conditions have failed to improve for many 
throughout the developing world. Heavily criticised in the 1970s for this failure to 
improve the quality of life in the third world, donors began looking for alternative means 
to implement their development initiatives. One such method was the utilization of 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) to assist in design, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs. This has created 
what could now be fairly described as a 'development industry.' 
Considering this industry and its perceived disappointments over the last 60 years 
the question arises whether the delivery of development aid is more effective when 
donors utilize INGOs. Given the current modes of resource distribution, choices for 
partnership, and established methods of implementation within the industry numerous 
arguments exist in support of the donor-INGO partnership. It is suggested that INGOs 
better reflect the perspective of the poor on the ground in contrast to large western 
governmental agencies. INGOs are also thought to be far more flexible in their 
programming and not as prone to corruption and incompetence as third-world 
governmental partners. INGOs are also a step away from the public scrutiny that often 
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intimidates western bureaucrats. Further, INGOs are utilized as an easy way to outsource 
large sums of cash directly to programmes that include the poor. Together these 
arguments suggest that without a significant INGO presence many donors would become 
overwhelmed by their own internal bureaucracy, host governments would fail in their 
capacity to deliver services and issues of corruption and accountability would dominate 
programming to the point of collapse. These arguments suggest that INGOs add value to 
donor programmes. But other analysts have expressed concern about the potential loss of 
autonomy that may arise from the dependence of INGOs on donors. 
To explore this tension the study evaluated the donor/INGO relationship in 
Zambia between the Swedish development agency SIDA and their INGO partner 
Diakona, and the relationship between USAID and the INGO PACT. The study asked 
how development programming has been transformed or revised as a result of the 
relationships that exist between donors and INGOs. The study also asked whether 
noteworthy differences existed between USAID and SIDA's behaviour when dealing 
with INGOs, and if so, whether these differences made for a more successful 
programming environment. 
USAID and SIDA are both large donors in Zambia; both regularly pursue 
programming through INGOs globally; but these donors hold conflicting reputations 
internationally. USAID disburses more development resources than any other 
organization globally, yet its legitimacy and motivations have frequently been a topic of 
debate and criticism. SIDA on the other hand is regularly perceived as a beacon of 
altruism but has been critiqued for its implementation practices. Ultimately, both 
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organizations have been criticized for failing to achieve real change in the lives of their 
beneficiaries. 
The choice of Zambia has been a strategic one. Zambia is one of the poorest 
countries globally and continues to experience serious developmental challenges. Yet 
Zambia has not had a significant conflict in modern history, is rich in natural resources 
and agricultural potential, and has received more development dollars per capita than 
almost any other nation in history. Despite this, the south-central African country holds 
one of the world's lowest life-expectancies; one of the highest HIV prevalence rates 
globally; one of the highest infant and child mortality rates, and is home to 1.3 million 
orphans in a country of only 11.4 million people. Zambia must therefore be seen as one 
of development's most puzzling quandaries, and as such, is an excellent petri dish in 
which to examine the effect of INGOs on development initiatives. 
Guided by the hypothesis that INGOs add value to development programming but 
potentially at a cost to their own autonomy, a literature review was conducted to gather 
data on what theoretical and empirical experience has been revealed about the use of 
INGOs in development initiatives. Secondly, SIDA and USAID history and policy 
materials orienting their work with INGOs was examined. Thirdly, interviews were 
carried out with senior and junior programme officers working for the USAID and SIDA 
Zambian field offices, as well as with programme officers from PACT and Diakonia 
Zambia. The governance and democratisation sector was selected as the focal point for 
the personnel, programmes and materials reviewed. 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature. Chapter 3 introduces the development context in 
Zambia and the work of USAID and SIDA there. Data from the interviews are reviewed 
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and compared in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes that the cases examined support the 
hypothesis that INGOs do provide programming value to donors but do so at a cost to 





What are international non-governmental organizations? 
This section reviews theoretical and empirical literature about INGOs, donors, and their 
mutual relationships' concerning development programming initiatives. By identifying 
the numerous theoretical positions which examine INGOs and donors, and providing a 
range of suppositions on the roles, activities and value of donor/INGO partnerships, a 
baseline of existing thought on these organizations is provided. 
The emergence of INGOs 
INGOs can be defined as organizations which exist somewhere in the relationship space 
between 'beneficiary' countries in the 'south', and donor agencies in the 'North.' For this 
study, INGOs are defined as northern-based NGOs which actively implement 
development programmes in underdeveloped countries. Why should northern-based 
NGOs be examined separately? According to the literature, INGOs retain several distinct 
characteristics from their southern sisters (Tvedt 1998). 
Firstly, INGOs and their personnel generally hold a distinct face amongst 
marginalized groups in developing countries. In short, INGO staff have had access to 
more education and are often from wealthier backgrounds. This disparity adorns them 
with the implication of greater access to resources and political power, and these 
differences must undoubtedly affect the manner in which they implement their programs 
(Alger 1990; Werker and Ahmed, 2007.) 
Secondly, INGOs are not historically embedded within the indigenous tribal, 
ethnic or political environments of the beneficiary populations they serve1 and are 
1 While INGOs are often in fact linked tribally, ethnically or politically to the environment they work in, 
i.e. through relationships with local gate keepers; central government agreements; or even their home 
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generally given more leeway by tribal, ethnic or political powers within the state. For 
example, while operating in an ethnically tense environment such as Rwanda, an 
international NGO will often not carry the same baggage as a tribally connected local 
counterpart. If the INGO holds no direct tribal or ethnic links within the region it will not 
be directly party to any troublesome history2 (Candler 2000; Tripp 2001). 
Thirdly, INGOs at times hold extensive political power within home donor states 
and so hold the potential to exercise political influence over selected donors (Raustiala 
1997; Streeten 1997; Olsen, Hoyen & Carstensen 2003; Zinnes and Bell 2003). 
Finally, some of the largest INGOs have global budgets which may be equal to or 
greater than many smaller donor agencies, and are thus attractive to governments of 
beneficiary states (Robinson 1989; Alger 1990; Postma 1994; Keck and Sikkink 1998; 
Friedman, Hochstetler & Clark 2001; Friedman, et al. 2001; Mundy & Murphy 2001). 
Ultimately, INGOs do exist and operate as separate entities from beneficiaries, the private 
sector, donors and local NGOs, and so can be evaluated as a distinct entity 
The historical reputation of INGOs 
Consistent in the literature is the notion that donors use INGOs on the basis of reputation. 
What is the evolution of this reputation? The following are very brief components of 
INGO's reputation based on organizational history for better or worse, and how past 
trajectories have affected their current standings. 
country's foreign policies, it should be fair to state that they are generally linked in very dissimilar manners 
than their southern cousins who of course have lineages, indigenous politics and varying levels of status in 
their native country. 
2 This argument does not however, encompass the potential of an INGO being perceived differently due to 
beneficiaries' external perspective on the organization's political, cultural or political origins. Such as an 
American NGO working in Rwanda. 
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One critical issue for INGOs is that of frequently displaying disappointing results. As 
many projects and programmes have achieved few tangible goals over the last 30 years, a 
growing disillusionment in the development industry as a whole has been fostered 
(Postma, 1994). Ultimately, economies or quality of life have simply not improved in 
most underdeveloped countries, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa. In fact, most African 
states' development indicators have dropped to catastrophic levels since the 1970s which 
has only aggravated criticisms of development programming. 
Yet despite a perceived history of underachievement, some theorists place large 
significance on the grassroots origins of INGOs who are seen to be motivated out of 
genuine concern for the global human condition (Alger, 1990). The births, histories and 
organizational behaviours of organisations such as the International Red Cross 
Committee (IRCC), Medecines Sans Frontieres (MSF) or Oxfam suggest that there is 
reasonable truth in the idea of a benevolent development industry (Terry, 2002). While 
these organizations are certainly not above critique, each has frequently shown itself to 
pursue the betterment of humanity and be motivated by intentions of 'doing good.' 
Subsequently, INGOs have been seen as offering a 'comparative advantage' to 
development programming because they have traditionally been able to deliver 'added 
value' that other agents could not or do not. Some theorists argue that the growth of 
INGOs is due to this usefulness in meeting need and that perhaps INGOs do serve a very 
real purpose in development with their own growth being proof of this (Sanyal, 1997; 
Brinkerhoff J. 2003; Werker and Ahmed, 2007). 
So the evolution of INGOs is complex and no simple labels or equations may be 
applied. Nonetheless, patterns do exist. Accepting that INGOs began as benevolent 
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grassroots organisations who fill gaps which donors and governments could not is a 
primary concept. And understanding that a murky history of accusation and complicity 
also accompanies INGOs is pragmatic. All of the above provide the necessary 
background and caveats to the following sections on INGO characteristics. 
Arguments for the use of INGOs 
Currently, development research and theory continues to grapple with a perceived 'crises 
in development' and questions persist concerning issues of accountability, sustainability 
or what exactly the means and ends of international development might be (Esman 1980; 
McAuslan 1996; Martinussen 1997). Do INGOs deliver better development 
programming? Plausible data exist to suggest that INGOs do. 
Perceptions of INGOs, their comparative advantage and implementation value 
A common perception is that INGOs exist out of genuine compassion and work for the 
betterment of the beneficiary populations they serve (Sanyal, 1997; Candler 2000; 
Fulcher 2000; Brinkerhoff, J. 2003; Werker and Ahmed, 2007). As mentioned previously, 
INGOs sprang from a tradition of charitable grassroots movements and it is this 
foundation upon which their reputation for good will is based. Prevalent throughout the 
literature are numerous theorists, such as Brinkerhoff and Costen, who write about the 
INGO world as a generally value-laden environment populated with those committed to 
an agenda of human or environmental betterment: 
This new set of actors [INGOs] generally has an agenda that stresses empowerment 
and people-centred development, which means that the value facet of development 
management emerges more strongly at the forefront (Brinkerhoff and Costen, 1999: 
351). 
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With the reputation of moral high-ground, INGOs tend to be viewed as trusted 
partners and as such hold a distinct advantage over other counterparts. These 
contemporaries include the private sector which is generally viewed as looking only to 
turn profit; developing country governments which are often perceived as being rife with 
corruption; or donor agencies who have neither the capacity nor political will to 
implement projects (Fisher, 1997; Tvedt, 2002). As Raustiala notes, this trusted status 
places INGOs in an exceptional position as intermediaries who can build bridges between 
other agents and players: 
The central assets with which NGOs bargain are legitimacy, transparency, and 
transnationalism. An equally important facet of bargaining... is the linkages NGOs 
create between global and local needs and actors. (Raustiala 1997: 725) 
Beyond their grassroots origins and trusted status, INGOs' reputation for genuine 
goodwill may also correlate directly to their ability to target those most in need. This 
attribute could be vital to INGOs' survival as even staunch critics of the development 
industry recognize that an ability to target poor populations is an essential comparative 
advantage in the industry (Chambers 1983; Gran 1983; Hyden 1986; Fisher 1997; 
Mequanent 1998; Finkel 2002). For example Riddell grudgingly notes that INGOs are 
better positioned to reach the poor, at least relative to the organizations which often 
finance them: 
As official aid is, at least initially, provided on a government to government basis, it 
is not easy for a donor to target its aid directly to specific groups of poor people (or 
to poor individuals), though some have certainly managed to do so for a proportion 
of aid disbursed. One preferred and increasingly popular way of reaching the poor is 
through Non-Governmental Organizations - supporting their projects and 
programmes. (Riddell, 1999: 320) 
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Riddell is not alone in his assessment. Many other theorists agree that INGOs perform 
well as mediators between donors, governments, and frequently hard to reach poor 
communities - sometimes in an essential capacity. As Jennifer Brinkerhoff documented 
in her observations of donor interactions in both Pakistan and India, INGOs played a vital 
role in programming designed to work with difficult to reach cohorts: 
Their [INGOs] participation was deemed necessary to project objectives because of 
their ability to reach into the community and particularly to target groups and 
regions that can be politically and socially difficult, such as adolescent girls. (J. 
Brinkerhoff 1999: 110) 
In order to better understand how or why the INGO world developed this 
comparative advantage, it is useful to consider why the use of INGOs came about in the 
first place. David Korten, in his examination of the professionalized civil society of the 
1970s, located considerable flaws in how donor organizations sought to implement 
resources. Korten found that a major issue for many donors centred around their own 
inability to design solutions for the poor: 
Projects currently in vogue presented] difficult problems which remain[ed] to be 
solved and their solution [was] inhibited by programming procedures better suited to 
large capital development projects than to people-centred development. (Korten, 
1980:481) 
Korten argued that donor organizations simply do not have the systemic 
organizational capacity to directly target the people they looked to assist and, as a result, 
began to search for solutions outside of their own institutions. As he illustrates in Table 1, 
donor organizations are not organizations conducive to working with the poor. 
Considering the restrictive, bureaucratic limitations of many donor organizations, it is not 
surprising that anecdotes abound of the NGO world's exceptional capability in accessing 
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the needy. Consequently, INGOs now have a reputation for being able to target the poor 
more effectively than donors. 
Table 1: Contradictions in 
Poverty-focused rural development 
involves projects which are: 
• Small 
• Administrative and 
personnel-intensive 
• Difficult to monitor and inspect 
• Slow to implement 
• Not suitable for complex 
techniques of project appraisal 
foreign assistance programming 
Donors remain impelled to prefer 
projects which are: 
• Large 
• Capital-and import-intensive 
• Easy to monitor and inspect 
• Quick to implement 
• Suitable for social cost-benefit analysis 
Source: Korten 1980: 484 
Another feature of INGO programming that suggests a more effective approach to 
implementation is the advantage of flexibility and innovation in programme design and 
implementation (Gran 1983; Streeten 1997; Murphy and Mundy 2001; Takao 2001). 
With one foot planted squarely in the educated, technologically booming developed 
world and the other fixed firmly in beneficiary communities, INGO personnel are well 
placed to gauge what might be most needed in programming. All the while being flexible 
enough to plan, amend, revise, modify, or simply change what they need to, as they need 
to (Alger 1990). As Murphy and Mundy note, '[INGOs] derive "their legitimacy" from 
their ability to make demands in terms of collective needs [and] from their innovative 
capacity to suggest ways to meet these needs' (Murphy and Mundy 2001). This flexibility 
is a feature which few government agencies could ever hope to replicate, but which they 
would easily understand as a vital asset for many successful development initiatives. 
16 
A fifth critical capability for INGOs is their perceived ability to build capacity 
amongst target populations - a vital component of sustainable programming 
(Martinussen, 1995; Finkel, 2002). As western development programming continues on 
wearily, calls for greater sustainability grow louder with every dollar spent. The 
realization that programmes which build capacity are essential to the creation of long-
term success has not been lost on funding communities. While assessing relationships 
between northern and southern NGOs in African development, Postma observes the 
potential for greater accomplishment might largely be located in capacity building 
exercises: 
By strengthening, for example, the assessment capabilities, information systems, and 
governing structures of national NGOs, their non-national partners could help to 
assure effective and efficient delivery of goods and services, as well as render more 
sustainable and permanent the organization itself. Investing in and consolidating 
organizational systems and structure would make further, future assistance easier to 
deliver. The benefits of institutional assistance would last longer and permeate more 
broadly and deeply into the community. And in a north-south partnership, goals and 
objectives would be co-determined. (Postma, 1994: 448) 
So with the reputation of being trusted by beneficiaries, whilst at the same time 
able to target poorer populations with innovative programming and implementation and 
the ability to build capacity, it is easy to understand why INGOs are perceived as 
attractive in the international development environment. As found below, a further 
appealing characteristic to many donors is that INGOs are often strategically viewed as 
the lesser of evils while evaluating potential partners. 
INGOs - an alternative to habitually inadequate partners 
Donor funding is reaching unprecedented heights in its seventh formal decade and yet 
global development targets such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are in 
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danger of remaining unmet. Consequently, academics, journalists, and advocates are 
critical of the fact that many bi-lateral development initiatives regularly fail due to a 
proliferation of endemic corruption within host governments. If the accusation is true, 
that donors cannot trust programming solely with host governments, it might also be 
argued that INGOs value as a development partner are elevated by default. When 
considering partnership choices - corrupt governments or INGOs - government may 
simply prove too difficult to manage. And in the world of international development, 
accusations of corrupt third world governments are abundant (Hammergren, 1999; 
Alford, 2000; Werker and Ahmed, 2007). For example, as McAuslan found in Kenya, 
donors have threatened to abandon programmes in the past when faced with associations 
often viewed more as a liability than a trusted partnership: 
If, as is the case in Kenya and Nigeria, corruption has been so institutionalized and 
"presidentialised" that virtually all aid programmes are infected by it, it may be 
necessary to wind up the aid programme completely, as the U.S. ambassador to 
Kenya hinted when she said in a speech that "American money will go elsewhere if 
corruption is not stemmed in Kenya" or, as Baroness Chalker had indicated, confine 
it to humanitarian aid administered by NGOs. (McAuslan 1996: 172) 
While government corruption remains perhaps the largest inhibitor to bi-lateral 
work with host governments, it is by no means the only impediment. A number of 
theorists argue that the crux of the development problem is that many third-world 
governments simply do not yet have the capacity or political will to facilitate, implement 
and sustain service delivery projects or programmes en mass (Hammergren, 1999). 
Subsequently, donors have frequently looked to INGOs for assistance in filling this 
vacuum, clearly a nod towards INGOs and their capacity. As Postma observes, the 
frustration of the donor community in seeing programmes regularly fail due to limited 
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capacity has led to a concerted effort to find alternative partners who can deliver. The 
most likely partners in these situations are, of course, third sector actors: 
Partnership and institutional development, as academic concepts and expressed 
practices of NGO personnel in Africa, did not reach prominence in a vacuum. The 
frustrations of working with government agencies and of seeing equipment not being 
maintained and post-project services dwindle, encouraged greater attention to 
building stronger southern non-governmental development organizations. (Postma 
1994:448) 
Beyond issues of corruption or capacity, a further obstacle is that the fiscal 
resources developing country governments have for service delivery are often not 
adequate to run even the most austere of programmes (Brinkerhoff and Costen, 1999). 
Minuscule tax bases; fluctuating global markets; structural adjustment policies; ever-
present conflict; the Cold War; natural disasters and most recently the HIV and AIDS 
pandemic have created an environment of disparity. This is further exacerbated by the 
reality that most third-world governments operate on extremely limited resources to 
begin with. Few governments anywhere would be capable of dealing with all of these 
challenges. And due to the immense need of many third world countries, the third sector 
has found a niche in which to thrive (Robinson, 1989; Galvin and Habib, 2003). As 
Brinkerhoff and Costen note, INGOs have flourished not solely out of a desire to assist, 
but also because of the genuine need of third world governments: 
The global economic and financial trends have brought new actors and new agendas 
onto the development scene. Predominant among them have been NGOs and civil 
society groups. As governments have been compelled to try to do more with less, 
and to cut back on state-supplied goods and services, NGOs have increasingly 
stepped in to fill the resulting gaps, both on their own and in partnership with the 
state (Brinkerhoff and Costen 1999; 351) 
By delivering services in gap areas, providing much needed relief, or helping to build 
capacity in a host government itself, INGOs negotiate space for themselves and establish 
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value. While not always the friendliest of relationships, more than ever, developing 
country governments partner with INGOs due to a very real need (Raustiala, 1997; 
Sanyal, 1997; Riddell, 1999). This relationship in itself might very well suggest that if 
true, INGOs do indeed offer value to development programming. 
While programming environments often push governments and INGOs together, 
donors may also strategically nurture these associations for their own needs. Donors 
recognize the value of a triangulated relationship, which keep them at arms length from 
critique. As it may be difficult to directly criticize a donor for their partnering INGO's 
work, it can be politically advantageous to establish relationships which offer a subtle 
tool for voicing disapproval or persuasion (Robinson, 1989; Galvin and Habib, 2003). If 
criticism comes from, or towards, an INGO rather than their donor, the opportunity for 
diplomatic dialogue is greater. 
Finally, it is also the case that donors may view INGOs as a valuable, alternative 
partner in countries with ineffectual or belligerent governments. Under these 
circumstances, a donor may use the INGO as a proxy agent for implementing their 
foreign policy; as an advocate for policy change within a host country; or as a 
'counterweight' to an unreceptive government (Robinson, 1989; Fulcher, 2000; Werker 
and Ahmed, 2007). 
When considering the above difficulties of working with some developing 
country governments, it is not hard to believe that donors might choose INGOs as a more 
attractive partner. However, INGOs themselves have come under scrutiny and it has been 
suggested that INGO inclusion in development programming does not always add value 
to the equation. The following section will examine these arguments. 
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Arguments against the use of INGOs as agents for development 
While the above outlines many INGO positives due both to their own inherent 
characteristics, as well as what sets them above the traditional development partners of 
host governments, a great deal of INGO critique exists as well. Truth be told, INGOs 
have received condemnation for their associations with donors, as well as for their own 
internal behaviours. 
A common critique of the aid industry is that aid is used as a tool for furthering 
donor country interests. Underlying this critique is the idea that many developing 
countries are coerced, co-opted or manipulated into acquiescence of western foreign 
policy agendas and/or trade initiatives through the receipt of aid (Boone, 1996; 
Mondlane, 1997; Alesina and Weder, 1999; Svensson, 2000; Bourguignon and Sundberg, 
2007). Extrapolating further, if donors do initiate international development programmes 
for reasons of self-interest, then the partners they choose to programme with must also 
come under scrutiny. 
An interesting aspect of this behaviour is that the level of self-interest is 
frequently proportional to the size of the donor. The larger the donor, the more self-
interested their programming tends to be. For example, states from the Nordic countries -
often referred to as 'small or middle powers' - are reputed to pursue pro-poor 
development programming free of any national agenda (Schraeder, et al., 1998). As 
Olson et al. point out, middle power states are often perceived differently than larger 
counterparts, and are commonly believed to programme for 'recipient needs' rather than 
self-interest: 
Donor interests consist of elements such as (national) security interests, economic 
interests (for example, trade and investment interests) and wider political interests. 
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'Recipient needs' are related to the economic and social level of development of 
poor countries. According to the 'aid-motivation literature', the allocation of 
development aid from big donors, such as the US, France, UK and European Union, 
tends to be motivated by donor interests, whereas small- and middle-sized donors, 
like the Scandinavian countries, are mainly motivated by the needs of the recipients 
when they give aid. (Olson, et al., 2003; 113) 
Subsequently, INGOs who work with small and middle-sized powers may very 
well behave differently than those who work with large powers. The design and quality 
of their programmes may also vary as a result. If large donors do in fact tend to use 
development aid programmes to promote their geo-political self-interests, it is not 
difficult to believe that by extension, donors use their INGO partners to pursue the same 
ends. Equally, if middle and small powers programme out of altruism, it is also not 
difficult to suppose that they use their INGO partners in this spirit of benevolence. How 
the consequences of such behaviours affect an INGO's programming value and 
effectiveness remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the issues is no doubt an area of 
consideration while evaluating an INGO's programming value. 
Moving back to the issue of self-interested programming, some theorists suggest 
that self-interested foreign policy agendas are pursued through circumventive techniques. 
In order to achieve this, the literature offers two separate approaches. The first, and more 
direct method, is by channelling funds and support to INGOs who directly participate in 
subversive activities. In doing this, donors may support organizations, such as INGOs, 
who then support opposition parties and agitative civil society in order to confront a 
targeted government (Feldman, 1997; Alford, 2000; Tvedt, 2002). Ultimately, as it is 
usually not diplomatically appropriate for a donor country to interfere in the political 
environment of another state, the job may be outsourced to an INGO and their own on-
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the-ground partners (O'Brien, 2005). This method unquestionably must affect the value 
of an INGO's programming. 
Another and more complicated method for using aid to promote self-interest is 
funding INGOs to replace or replicate faltering social services in a third world country 
encouraged to downsize their own service delivery frameworks. This method applies 
particularly when structural adjustment programmes are at play (Fulcher, 2000; Takao, 
2001; Igoe, 2003), and has implications for the quality and value of an INGO's 
programming over the long-term. Frequently, only by curtailing service delivery 
provision in health care, education or other service delivery programmes are many third 
world governments able to comply with demanding economic adjustment programmes. 
Afterwards, INGOs are contracted to work as surrogates for state services. The reality is 
however, that INGOs are actually components of privatization policies which look to 
scale back third world governmental frameworks, and so render them further dependant 
(Feldman, 1997). Under these circumstances, even highly effective INGO programmes 
could be called into question for both their sustainable value and impact on indigenous 
service delivery (Sanyal, 1997; Van de Walle, 1999; Takao, 2001). As Korten suggests, 
little substantiation exists that over the long-term INGOs are more effective than 
counterpart government programmes: 
It is frequently suggested that what is needed is more private initiative in attacking 
the problems which government bureaucracies cannot manage. Though the view is 
an attractive one, there is little evidence to suggest that, when undertaken on 
anything approaching the scale required, private voluntary efforts are consistently 
more effective than those of government. (Korten 1980: 483) 
Another condemnation of INGOs directly challenges their stated reputation for 
bringing added value to development programming, and which relates to donor behaviour 
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itself. Theorists such as Nicolas van de Walle suggest that INGOs are being utilized to 
save fiscal resources, as well as to deflect culpability from donors' programming failures. 
Van de Walle and others intimate that INGOs are frequently not as effective as donors 
suggest, but it is in the best interest of everyone involved to state otherwise 
(Hammergren, 1999; Werker and Ahmed, 2007). Van de Walle also notes that the current 
track record of outsourced programming remains strikingly similar to failures of the past 
when donors worked to implement programmes directly: 
.. .it has been very tempting for donors to treat NGOs as little more than a cost-
effective service provider for their activities in certain sectors. It saves donors money 
and allows them to avoid addressing implementation activities. In such cases, the 
similarity with the independent project units of the past is striking and, like them 
before, it is difficult to see how they can contribute to long-term institution building 
outside of the state. (Van de Walle, 1999: 348) 
Adding to the above is the question of why donors accept INGO programmes as 
wholesale successes in the first place. This may happen in large part because donors 
sometimes negotiate INGOs into situations where achievable goals and objectives remain 
difficult or impossible. Due to the democratic politics of many donor countries, pressures 
on bureaucrats from both elected officials and taxpayers to fulfill given mandates can be 
enormous. As these mandates are established in London, Washington, Tokyo and other 
donor capitals, it is not so hard to believe that the mandates in question are sometimes 
unattainable. As a result, donor field offices may need their sub-contracted partners to 
appear to succeed - even when they do not, or cannot. These circumstances are 
aggravated when INGOs themselves do not realize, or choose not to realize, their own 
programme shortcomings. These circumstances could certainly affect the end value of 
INGO programming. If honest criticisms of INGO programming are restrained, then how 
might design or implementation flaws be corrected in the future? 
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Another critique of how this relationship might affect INGO programming value 
is that donors sometimes consider INGOs to be a magic solution to all problems (Tendler, 
1982; Vivan, 1994). As discussed earlier, INGOs have a reputation for benevolence and 
close connections to the grassroots. As such, they can be perceived to be the answer to 
whatever developmental problem exists. This situation can be exacerbated if a donor is in 
urgent need of successful results. An INGO's solution can be a square plug pushed by a 
donor into a developmental round holed problem. This phenomenon can most certainly 
undermine the value an INGO might bring to the development environment. But as Igoe 
remarks, when donors become persuaded, converted or desperate, INGOs are seen as a 
panacea, and utilized no matter the outcome: 
Vivian (1994) found that donors in Zimbabwe treated local NGOs as a 
'magic bullet' that would find its target no matter how poorly fired. Tendler 
(1982), an insider to the development industry for over thirty years, has 
written about 'NGO articles of faith' - working assumptions that NGOs are 
inherently altruistic, autonomous, co-operative, efficient, empowering, 
participatory, and transparent. (Igoe, 1994: 866) 
A further critique of the relationship and its effects on INGO programming lies in 
the fact that donors are under enormous pressure to disburse large sums of money. In 
fact, most donor agencies' primary measure of performance lies in their ability to 
distribute large sums of scandal free resources. In turn, INGOs are also evaluated by 
their ability to disburse resources. And if donors pressure INGOs to absorb greater sums 
of money than planned for, INGO personnel can become more engaged in spending than 
implementing. This situation can most certainly affect an INGO's developmental value 
(Hammergren, 1999; Van de Walle, 1999). 
A final criticism of the donor/INGO engagement is that INGOs can be more 
accountable to their donors than their beneficiaries (de Waal, 1997; Hammergren, 1999; 
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Yasuo, 2001). INGOs are usually funded from donor capitals in distant cities and so are 
generally free to operate in the manner they see fit. As long as they follow the 
appropriate reporting methods and remain scandal free, donors are often generally 
satisfied. Furthermore, by employing their own monitoring schemes and managing their 
donors' fear of political scandal, INGOs have no immediate motivation to be accountable 
to the populations they work to assist. With minimal supervision, the quality and value of 
some INGOs' programmes must undoubtedly diminish. As Werker and Ahmed point out, 
unlike the public or private sectors, accountability for INGO programming is self-
imposed and usually left to the INGO itself, 
Non-governmental organizations deliver goods and services to a population that 
provides little feedback on the range or quality of product delivered. Compared to 
usual market or political settings, beneficiaries have a weakened ability to use market 
forces to penalize and reward NGOs. Citizens can vote out an incumbent from an 
office and consumers can choose not to purchase a product from a for-profit provider, 
but villagers may be hostage to the particular developmental scheme that happens to 
be funded by the designated local NGO. (Werker and Ahmed, 2007: 8) 
Putting aside donor involvement in INGO programming, a number of other issues 
arise which might call into question the developmental value of INGOs. Firstly, an INGO 
may act from a politically uninformed vantage point caused by a lack of cultural or 
political understanding of the society in which they programme. For example, activist or 
advocacy INGOs may not always promote policy that is pragmatically sound, but rather 
demand the most egalitarian solutions to problems due to reasons of principle. However, 
these solutions can also be politically unrealistic and undermine more practical 
endeavours. Unfortunately, an INGO's programming might very well undermine an 
area's long-term development (Young, 2001). 
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Further criticism of INGOs stems from their potential to disrupt local civil 
society. A powerful INGOs' presence and resources can disturb the organic composition 
of the civil environment by providing artificial incentives, suggesting artificial desires, 
and creating an artificial sphere in which organizations could/would otherwise grow 
differently. By trading funding and access for association and partnership, local groups 
can be led by INGOs to voice opinions about political or social issues not necessarily in 
their immediate best interest. Furthermore, pursuit of these issues may draw attention 
away from more pressing needs, or even stifle southern NGO opportunities including 
staving off local political attention, poaching human resources or diminishing fundraising 
capacities (Feldman, 1997; Ohayo, 1999). 
To summarize, criticism of the role of the donor/TNGO relationship in 
development programming offers a number of contested issues. One is the belief that aid 
is often viewed as a tool for furthering donor country interests. Additionally, it is 
commonly believed that funds are sometimes channelled to INGOs to target unfavoured 
third world governments by offering support to friendly opposition parties and civil 
society. Aid can also be provided to INGOs to replace or replicate faltering social 
services so as to encourage states to downsize their own service delivery. Additionally 
some theorists critique INGOs on the basis that few have the capacity, resources or 
political clout to implement the scale of programmes required for substantial, sustainable, 
state change. INGOs are also sometimes seen as being employed to save fiscal resources 
for donors, as well as to deflect culpability from programming failures. INGOs have also 
been attacked for simply not being as effective as donors often suggest. Another 
significant critique of the INGO/donor relationship is that donors, at times, consider 
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INGOs to be a magic bullet which can mend all problems. It is suggested within the 
literature that these circumstances sometimes exist because donors are under enormous 
pressure to regularly disburse large sums of resources, which can also lead to 
organizational paralyses within an INGO. Adding to this, INGOs are often accountable 
only to their donors, rather than their beneficiaries. 
From an organizational standpoint INGOs are also called into question from time 
to time. At the heart of the matter is the potential for an INGO to be acting from a 
politically uninformed vantage point, often due to a lack of social immersion. Moreover, 
this involvement in local civil society can disturb the organic civil environment by 
providing artificial incentives, suggesting artificial desires, and creating an artificial 
sphere in which organizations could/would otherwise grow. In conclusion, the literature 
suggests reasons to be optimistic as well as cautious about the developmental value of 
INGOs. 
In the late 1960s Kjell Skjelsbaek made remarkably accurate predictions based on 
extrapolated INGO growth and paths (Skjelsbaek, 1971). He also predicted that the social 
capital and favoured status required for INGOs' survival would be traded for an on-the-
ground comparative advantage, political knowledge and favours: "Qualitatively, some 
NGOs feel that they trade information and expertise for the dubious prestige of being on 
a list of selected consultants" (Skjelsbaek 1971; 437). Skjelsbaek's foretelling speaks to 
what some theorists have been hypothesising for the last several decades: that INGOs 
lose autonomy when programming with large donor agencies (Alger 1990; Fisher 1997; 
Tvedt 2002). 
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The following chapters examine two INGOs working in the democracy and 
governance sector in Zambia from these optimistic and critical perspectives. One INGO, 
PACT, works with USAID and the other, DIAKONIA, with SIDA. US AID and SIDA 





Zambia is a country rich in copper and cobalt, and has excellent soil and space for 
agriculture. Unlike five of its eight neighbouring countries, Zambia has remained conflict 
free and is proudly peaceful. Equally dissimilar to most of its neighbours, Zambia's 
independence came relatively easily. Even its landlocked position in a region rife with 
conflict has at times proven to be a relative blessing for the large south central African 
state of 11.4 million people. As a central hub to the region, Zambia has seen its borders 
flooded by Angolans, Namibians, Congolese, Mozambicans, and at present, growing 
multitudes of Zimbabweans.3 What has trailed the refugees however, are enormous 
measures of international attention as well as the large fiscal disbursements that often 
follow. 
Nonetheless, and despite the above noted advantages, as a least developed country 
(LDC) Zambia is home to one of the highest rates of poverty globally, with 64 per cent of 
the population living in destitution as of 2006 (GRZ, Living Conditions Monitoring 
Survey, 2006). UNDP's Human Development Report additionally notes that although 
Zambia's Human Development Index (HDI) has risen gradually since 1994, it continues 
to measure only 0.462 out of a total value of 1, and so was ranked at 165 of 177 countries 
globally in 2007 (UNICEF, 2007; UNDP, 2007). In fact, Zambia is the only country in 
the world for which the HDI value in 1998 was lower than in 1975. 
Reasons for the above are to be found in a myriad of explanations. An early factor 
in the country's underdevelopment may be located in the capacity of its brain trust after 
independence. At the time of independence in 1964 Zambia had only 109 university 
graduates with which to build a functioning government (Tordoff, 1974; Meredith, 2006.) 
3 As of December 31,2007, Zambia continued to host over 120,000 refugees. (UNHCR, 2007) 
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However, many economists contend that the beginning of Zambia's developmental 
collapse coincided with President Kaunda's mono-economic dependency on copper in the 
1970s. This reliance was wholesale, and so, early in the decade when copper 
commodities experienced sharp declines, the country was left with few dependable 
sources of revenue. 
From a political-economy perspective it has also been suggested that Zambia was 
simply not prepared for the radical swing from Kenneth Kaunda's 'Africanist' version of 
socialism during the 70s and 80s, to the 1991 Presidential-elect, Fredrick Chiluba, and his 
wholesale shift to a free-market economy through the 1990s. This dramatic shift in 
economic philosophy thrust radical change onto Zambia's markets, society and people. 
The period is distinguished by an economic and human development 'bottoming-out' due 
to the closure of Zambia's parastatals, collapsing governance structures, and 
exceptionally high rates of inflation (UNCTAD 2005). Undoubtedly the Chiluba years 
were particularly grueling, also due in large part to the rampant corruption that occurred 
at this time (Guest 2004). And it was during this period that Zambia's HDI ranking 
dropped dramatically (see table 2 below). Considering all of the challenges Zambia 
experienced between 1980 and 2000, it is a wonder the country remained intact as the 
Zambian Government was dangerously close to collapse. During this difficult phase 
Zambians received less education, had fewer resources with which to survive, and died 
younger than ever previously recorded. 
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Table 2: Zambia's HDI Decline (UNDP Website; 2008) 
In 2001 the Presidential administration changed hands for a third time, and began 
its slow climb towards economic recovery. Sadly though, no evidence exists that the 
current economic growth and increase in wealth has begun to trickle down. Despite an 
economy on the rise, most Zambians continue to suffer from extreme poverty. 
One explanation for Zambia's continued wealth polarization has been affixed to 
the country's political structures. Due to power asymmetries in the constitution, 
Government in Zambia have been cited as a strong example of patrimonialism (Harland, 
2008; Guest, 2004.) As the constitution awards the President with extensive 
administrative powers, he (or she) holds the ability to appoint virtually every position of 
authority in the country. This includes 65 appointed Members of Parliament, a further 8 
nominated Cabinet Ministers, most of the top judiciary, the police, all District 
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Commissioners, and virtually anyone else of influence in Zambia's Government 
(Harland, 2008; Muyoyeta 2006; Amnesty International, 2006.) In fact, it is believed that 
intimates of President Mwanawasa, including family and friends, held up to half of the 
senior positions in the Zambian Government (Africa Confidential, 2004.) 
Significantly complicating the above is the ongoing dilemma of HIV and AIDS 
which has left Zambia's human resources thoroughly drained, and has further corroded 
the country's social fabric. With a conservatively estimated HIV prevalence of 14.3 per 
cent (GRZ, Zambia Demographic and Health Survey, Preliminary Report, 2007), a 
median age of 16 years old; a life expectancy as low as 38 years of age; an under-5 
mortality rate of 202 deaths per 1000 live births; and an estimated 1. 3 million orphans in 
a country of 11.4 million, Zambia, like much of southern Africa, has been devastated by 
the pandemic (UNICEF, 2000). Truth be told the effects of HIV and AIDS have vastly 
overshadowed any damage done by Zambia's inconsequential Governments, the region's 
geo-politics, the effect of commodity prices or even colonization. Simply put, the HIV 
and AIDS pandemic is a living, continuing and sweeping genocide. 
Consequentially, as a democratic, private market LDC near the bottom of the 
HDI, the country has been a primary focus for donor resources. According to journalist, 
Robert Guest, Zambia is one of the top recipients for development funding globally, per 
capita, since 1949 (Guest, 2004.) In fact, between 33 per cent and 53 per cent of the 
national budget was funded through donor contributions through the period of 1996 to 
2005 (Harland, 2008.) 
Thus, despite a history of peace and an abundance of resources, Zambia remains 
underdeveloped. It is thus appropriate to ask why foreign aid has achieved so little in 
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Zambia and in what ways INGOs are implicated in that result? To gain insight a 
consideration of the efforts of US AID and SID A and their INGO partner organizations in 
Zambia are examined based on their policy and programming literature. 
Donor Reputations, Donor Cultures 
One of the most noteworthy characteristics of SID A and US AID is that they are globally 
significant donors, with development funding from the U.S. being the largest in terms of 
total sums of resources allocated, and Sweden ranked seventh (in terms of countries) 
globally for funds disbursed (Easterly and Pfutze, 2008). Both donors have large 
programmes in the majority of English-speaking Africa, and particularly in Zambia. 
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However, throughout the literature there exists a considerable normative separation 
between the two donors when considering how and why they implement development 
programming. As mentioned above, the U.S. remains the largest donor of ODA, yet 
Sweden is in fact positioned 2nd (behind Norway) in terms of ODA contributed based on 
Gross National Income (GNI) percentage of 0.92 earmarked for development 
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programming. Conversely, the U.S. is ranked much farther below at the 21st position, 
with only 0.22 per cent of its GNI contributed annually (Padilla and Tomlinson, 2006).4 
Moreover, Easterly and Pfutze assert that their research found Sweden to be very high 
(tied for third place with Norway) in terms of implementing aid effectively, while the 
United States ranked near the bottom of donor aid effectiveness, 
Three types of aid are widely considered to be intrinsically not very effective: tied 
aid, food aid, and technical assistance... 
.. .The most highly ranked bilateral aid agencies on skipping the ineffective channels 
are Switzerland, Ireland, and Norway and Sweden (sharing third place), while the 
lowest ranked are Greece, Australia, and the United States. (Easterly and Pfutze, 
2008:17-18) 
The researchers also evaluated the OECD and multi-laterals for 'overall best practices' in 
delivering aid and placed Sweden reasonably high at the seventh spot but located the U.S. 
far lower in the sixteenth position, 
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(Easterly and Pfutze, 2008: 21) 
In agreement with the above, Dollar and Levin also found Sweden to be a high 
performing donor in terms of strategic programming, while their data indicates American 
funding to be much further down the list of 24 bi-lateral and multi-lateral donors. In their 
research they observe that Sweden ranked near the top in terms of 'poverty selectivity' 
4 The United Nations has suggested that an appropriate level of ODA would sit at 0.7% of GNI. 
policies, with US AID again being located near the bottom for how they deliberately 
disbursed their funding. The research suggests that American resources earmarked for 
human development are not always targeted at reducing poverty but rather focus on 
serving alternative agendas, 
There are a number of bilateral donors that appear high up in the rankings for policy 
and poverty selectivity, such as Denmark, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom, 
Ireland, and the Netherlands. However, some of the large donors in absolute size, 
such as France and the United States, are not particularly selective in either the 
policy or poverty dimension. (Dollar and Levin, 2004:14) 
Further, Alesina and Weder find Scandinavian countries in general to be more oriented 
towards less corrupt governments, while American foreign aid interests tend to fixate on 
particular modes of government. In their findings they state that American funding is 
most often targeted at countries holding democratic categorizations. They further suggest 
that this in itself is a foundation for programming rather than consideration of the quality 
of governance in the country, 
Consistently with evidence on other variables Scandinavian donors (the most 
generous in per capita terms) do reward less corrupt receivers. On the other hand the 
US appear to favor democracies, but seems to pay no attention whatsoever to quality 
of government of receiving countries. (Alesina and Weder, 2002: 20) 
Finally Roodman, et al., place Sweden's commitment to international aid as third 
globally, with the United States tied for the thirteenth spot with Ireland. While scoring for 
aid delivery in particular, Sweden's ranking moves up a notch to fill the second position, 
with the U.S. falling into a tie for the 18 position (Roodman, et al., 2006) 
Although much of the above quantitatively delineates Sweden and the US in 
terms of the quality and efficiency of their aid delivery, it does not necessarily speak to 
matters of motivation. Beyond the 'way' in which donors behave, is the more pressing 
issue of 'why' they choose to behave in the way they do. Again the literature finds that 
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Sweden, like many small- and middle-sized donors, works from an inclination for 
benevolence. On the other hand, US AID, like most of the large donors, is generally 
inclined to work for self-interested motivations. 
Schraeder, et al. support this analysis, but also conclude that both countries' 
motivations are reactions to a half century of Cold War. Interestingly, they attribute the 
effect of communism on each country's psyche as pivotal in their respective aid 
behaviours. From the American vantage point, they suggest that foreign aid was utilized 
as weapon and tool in a global struggle against communism. However, the researchers 
propose that the Swedish experience, which was also rooted in socialism, grew from a 
sense of 'commonality' that fostered relationships with which Americans would have 
been uncomfortable (Schraeder, et al., 1999). 
Another rationale for such a dramatic difference in each countries' psychological 
approach to aid must certainly also be rooted in the culture of their respective countries. 
Within two strong democracies it is not so hard to believe that domestic culture would 
inform foreign policy. And as Roodman observes when comparing the two cultures, 
Swedish private citizens contribute significantly higher individual donations than their 
American counterparts. Thus, it is implied that Swedes may approve of the act of 
international aid far more than Americans, 
Rich nations are often compared on how much they share their wealth with poorer 
countries. The Nordics and the Netherlands, it is noted, are the most generous with 
foreign assistance, while the United States gives among the least aid per unit of gross 
domestic product. (Roodman, 2006:. 2) 
Supporting the above, and from a cultural perspective, Birdsall's research 
indicates that North American tax payers hold less faith in development assistance than 
populations in Western Europe. Consequentially, the latter's donor agencies tend to be 
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less open and more secretive about their programming. The author goes on to imply this 
phenomenon could provide cover for somewhat disingenuous activities. Speaking of 
North American aid in general (as well as Australia), Birdsall sheds light on how the 
three cultures unconsciously promote a climate of confidentiality, 
Official and private agencies that develop and manage development 
assistance programs hesitate, with some justification, to advertise the limits 
of their craft. In the donor countries that finance assistance, suspicion that 
such assistance is wasted runs high, and exposure of a program's current 
shortcomings could reduce its future funding. Even if only a cover for lack of 
generosity, such suspicions are politically important. It is easier to limit than 
to expand foreign aid budgets, and in the interests of the latter, those who see 
and work with the urgent needs of people in poor countries have no obvious 
incentive to invest in long-term evaluation of what they do. (Birdsall, 2005: 
11) 
Birds of a feather flock together, or so the argument goes. And surreptitious donors may 
very well beget disreputable partners. Yet, if donors with questionable behaviour sub-
contract INGO's, this relationship alone does not necessarily indict a partner 
organization. Moreover, despite whatever behaviours a donor exhibits, either positive or 
otherwise, this may not necessarily affect an INGO's programmatic value. INGOs are 
after all, massive organizations with independent administrations who answer to their 
own autonomous board of governors. Nonetheless, a devious donor legitimizes calls for 
greater scrutiny and higher suspicions. At the very least a patron's behaviour should 
imply what is possible from a benefactor. 
SIDA's History 
In terms of developmental motivations in the literature, a genuine impression exists that 
SIDA operates from a perspective of benevolence and altruism as discussed previously 
(Streeten, 1997; Dreher, et al., 2007). Statistically, and alongside its Nordic counterparts, 
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SIDA is an organization that seemingly programmes generally without concern for its 
own commercial or geo-political needs. However, when considering the organization's 
good reputation for sound development programming, some researchers wonder if 
SIDA's utilization of NGOs is the most effective path to successful implementation. 
Dreher et al. found throughout their own literature review, and in their own research as 
well, that despite morale motives and a desire to effect change, Swedish sponsored NGOs 
do not often achieve their stated long-term programming goals, 
".. .while typically achieving their "stated and immediate objectives," the overall 
development impact of Swedish NGO projects was small, with three of... four 
country studies even suggesting that NGO projects "did not often reach the poorest." 
(Dreher, et al., 2007: 7) 
Perhaps one obstacle in achieving long-term, sustainable success in the field can 
be attributed to organizational behaviour at home. As even the most fluid of organizations 
can experience difficulties attempting to operationalize programme plans, government 
bureaucracies may simply be too managerially 'heavy' to institute the type of attitudes 
and approaches required for successful programming. One example of this is found in 
Cornwall and Pratt's analysis of SIDA, which examines the agency's work to incorporate 
greater participatory practices. Despite a genuine sincerity to incorporate participatory 
philosophies, institutionalizing the practice continues to be largely unsuccessful, 
Over the course of the 1990s, almost every development organization came 
to embrace the idea that participation is good for development. For Sida, the 
ideals that participation represents have deep, enduring roots. Yet, while no-
one would disagree that participation is important, internal champions have 
found institutionalizing participation in Sida an uphill struggle. (Cornwall 
and Pratt, 2004: 4) 
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Considering that SIDA has shown real difficulty in facilitating participatory elements into 
its own institution, it must be wondered how the organization encourages such practices 
within its partner organizations. 
Other SIDA failings surface in examinations of the agency's working 
relationships with NGOs as well. An example of this is found in an evaluation of their 
sponsorship of Humanitarian Mine Activities (HMA) programmes. Although the 
organization demonstrated an ability to remain flexible and innovative, SIDA's own 
analysis found weakness in other areas. Of particular interest was the finding that partners 
tended to be weak in terms of coordination efforts and capacity building exercises -
characteristics usually considered to be INGO strengths, 
Nongovernmental organizations have become the most oft-used 
implementation channel within mine action. An emerging, albeit less 
common, channel is that of national governments. A review of the strengths 
and weaknesses of NGOs and governments as implementation channels 
suggests that NGOs are particularly strong in their ability to tailor approaches 
to fit the needs of a given context. NGOs are also noteworthy for their 
abilities to develop and implement innovative responses and for the manner 
in which they have sought to institutionalize impact assessment. However, 
NGOs appear weaker in their ability to coordinate efforts with other 
humanitarian initiatives and have displayed little capacity to build local 
organizations with the potential to sustain HMA [Humanitarian Mine 
Activities] activities after their departure. (SIDA - D, 2006: 3) 
Despite the above, SIDA's reputation as a partner is that of being 
accommodating and easy to work with. According to the literature, the organization is 
inclined to plan and work with partners - drawing upon their partners' experience. This 
remains a significant difference to the more top-down, American approach of simply 
hiring NGOs to implement USAID designed initiatives. In contrast to American 
methods, and as Berg, et al., have documented, SIDA looks to fund NGO programming 
initiatives on NGO terms, allowing for a potentially higher degree of NGO autonomy, 
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Sida has been a relatively flexible donor, allowing agencies with which it 
collaborates considerable freedom to manoeuvre in terms of designing approaches 
deemed appropriate at a particular time. At an overall level, the reactive position 
taken by Sida has been constructive in the early stages of HMA, when innovation in 
terms of trying out new approaches was vital. (Berg, et al., 2006: 69) 
Additionally, the literature suggests that SIDA utilizes working relationships 
with NGOs regularly, and demonstrates genuine commitment to harmonious 
partnerships. In fact according to Paul Streeten, and perhaps in somewhat 
exaggeration, SIDA contributes 80 per cent of its aid to NGOs (Streeten, 1997: 207).5 
One consequence of such a high degree of dependence on NGOs is that these 
relationships have been criticized for potentially utilizing INGOs as agents of Swedish 
foreign policy. As SIDA falls under the mandate of the Swedish Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, whose embassies in fact house SIDA country offices globally, it must be 
wondered how autonomous the agency can be from the concerns of Foreign Affairs. 
Although a number of checks and balances are built into the development funding 
system, Dreher, while citing Riddell, Bebbington and Peck, notes that there is the 
possibility that NGOs are influenced by their Swedish benefactors, 
Arguably, the dependence of many NGOs on government funding shapes the 
incentives of NGOs in a way that renders them unlikely to become superior 
donors. In the case of Sweden, the Swedish International Development 
Cooperation Agency (SIDA) supports the NGOs' self-defined development 
activities through the so-called NGO window... Various critics suspect that 
government funding may have as a result that NGOs become "the 
implementer of the policy agendas" of governments. NGOs may then behave 
as state agencies so that their aid allocation would no longer be superior in 
terms of targeting the neediest recipients. (Dreher, et al., 2007: 5) 
5 While Paul Streeten remains a very well respected academic this figure is controversial. When questioned 
about the sum, several ex-SIDA personnel - including their former Head of Department for Africa, Lotta 
Sylwander, found the number hard to accept, but did suggest that the organization does contribute a large 
sum of resources to NGOs in general. Interview with UNICEF Country Representative, Lotta Sylwander, 
former Head of Department for Africa, August 4, 2008. 
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SIDA in Zambia 
SIDA's continued general budget support for Zambia in 2008, based on the one-year 
agreement with the Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ), was $53,341,200 
USD (SEK 360 million), excluding staff and administration costs. In addition, Sweden 
disbursed a further $2,897,485 USD on behalf of Norway in the agriculture sector, as 
well as $17,382,140 USD on behalf of the Netherlands in the health sector. The Swedish 
agency and embassy combined have a staff of 19 Swedish nationals and 22 locally 
employed staff. It terms of Governance projects, SIDA will have disbursed $4,550,346.67 
to Zambian good governance and democratization programmes over the 2008 calendar 
year, and a total of nearly $46 million US dollars in programming. (SIDA - E, 2008) 
Implementing the above noted resources, the international development donor 
agency focuses on four separate Country Strategy Goals in Zambia, with Goal 3 being 
dedicated to the Democracy and Governance Sector, 
Goal 3: Contributing to the promotion of democratic governance and the 
development of a society in which the state accepts it's responsibility to 
respect, protect and provide all men, women and children with their civil, 
political, economic and cultural rights; and miscellaneously other 
crosscutting issues including HIV and AIDS. (SIDA - A, 2008) 
For practical guidance on Goal 3, the agency draws its philosophical raison d'etre 
from directives rooted in Stockholm, particularly from Government Bill 2002/03:122: 
Sweden's Policy for Global Development, which passed parliament in 2003. The 
language of Bill 122 remains convergent with SIDA Zambia's Goal 3 when rationalizing 
the value of the governance and democratization sector and the participation it facilitates. 
Addressing these issues under Section 5.4.2 Democracy and Good Governance Bill 122 
notes that, 
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Further efforts should be made to develop central political principles and 
procedures for issues such as accountability, participation, transparency and 
the distribution of power. Forms and mechanisms for the prevention and 
peaceful resolution of social and political conflicts should be supported and 
further developed. (SID A - B, 2003: 24) 
Explicitly stated in online public relations material accompanying the Bill is text which 
directly attributes good governance, democracy and participation as a primary means for 
greater human development. The material further ties development directly to an 
assortment of issues including democratic governance; freedom of expression; an 
impartial judiciary; free elections; tolerance for individuals and groups; access to 
information; accountability; a well functioning political system; and independent media 
and active NGOs (SIDA - B, 2003). Interestingly, the text not simply correlates 
development success in the Scandinavian country with good governance and democracy, 
but further suggests that Sweden's experiences in government should serve as a model 
for global development (SIDA - B, 2003). 
In line with the above, SIDA's commitment to enhancing governance and 
democracy in Zambia appears legitimate. Their annual report for 2007 notes that the 
donor not only worked with civil society for the development of government and 
democracy in Zambia, but also sought to implement in partnership with the GRZ in 
sectors including two of the three components of the Government's Public Sector Reform 
Programme, namely the Public Expenditure Management and Financial Accountability 
Programme (PEMFA), as well as the Public Service Management Programme (PSM) 
(SIDA-A, 2008). 
The agency's other governance and democratization programme component 
centers around partnerships which strengthen civil society, another mandate of Bill 122. 
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Under Section 5.7.2, Civil society and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the 
language concerning partnerships with Swedish third sector development agencies is 
clear in that these relationships should occur. Yet the document remains ambiguous as to 
what exactly these relationships should accomplish, 
There should be increased collaboration with Swedish organizations and popular 
movements. The role of organizations as international promoters of solidarity and 
cooperation should be strengthened. (SIDA - B, 2003: 55) 
However, the accompanying public relations text does offer tangible reasons why 
Swedish NGOs are useful in development initiatives. The text suggests a number of 
comparative advantages which could prove useful but which focus on the public 
awareness and networking potential of civil society rather than on the explicit stimulation 
of development, 
These organizations are indispensable as lobbyists and formers of public opinion, 
awareness raisers and public educators. They have played a very significant role 
when it comes to the general population's willingness to support international 
development cooperation. Furthermore, many organizations are important actors 
when it comes to the practical implementation of development programmes either 
within the framework of development cooperation between Swedish and foreign 
organizations or because of their long experience in various developing countries... 
Public interest in global issues is greater than ever before, especially among young 
people. Global networks of new social movements are emerging, and are making an 
ever greater impact on the global agenda by international exchanges of information 
and worldwide alliances and mobilization. Contacts are made and experiences 
exchanged. This trend inspires hope for the future. It promotes increased global 
awareness and understanding, and strengthens international solidarity. (SIDA - B, 
2003:55) 
Many of these comparative advantages echo positions identified in the literature review 
(see Appendix I). These characteristics include /. INGOs retain a distinct, external face 
amongst marginalized groups; 2. are very differently linked to the tribal, ethnic or 
political environments of their beneficiaries, 3. Hold extensive political power within 
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home donor states; 8. have an ability to target poor populations; 10. Build capacity 
amongst target populations; 11. offer a comparative advantage to programming; and, 17. 
are useful as an advocate for policy change and public education. 
In the SIDA Zambia field office, support for INGOs, particularly in the 
democracy and governance sector, as well as HIV and AIDS, seems to be high. SIDA's 
Country strategy for development cooperation in Zambia, January 2003 - December 
2007, notes that while tangible results are difficult to quantify, the donor was satisfied 
enough with the visible results that it called for further support to the sector, 
Although it is more difficult at this stage to draw firm conclusions about 
programme and project objectives, joint donor support for voter and civic 
education programmes in the run-up to the 2001 general election is thought to 
have resulted in increased and broader participation. Swedish support for 
legal advice centres run by NGOs has also contributed to improved access to 
legal assistance among the poorer sections of the community. However, if 
Swedish support is to have a wider, sustainable impact, continued efforts 
forming part of a well structured, focused programme will be necessary in the 
coming strategy period. (SIDA - C, 2003: 12) 
In Zambia, SIDA works in the governance and democracy sectors with two 
separate INGOs, Save the Children Sweden, and the Swedish NGO umbrella 
organization Diakonia. Among many other mandates, Save the Children works as to 
advocate the GRZ for greater children's social services and realization of rights, 
particularly in terms of the ratification of the Convention of the Rights of the Child. 
Diakonia on the other hand, acts as an administrator and conduit for Swedish civil society 
funding globally, and is the primary supporter for 11 separate Zambian NGOs. Diakonia 
supported NGOs are locally based and implement democracy and governance 
programmes from election education to women's rights. While both INGOs were 
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contacted for the purpose of this study, Save the Children was not able to participate and 
so Diakonia was selected as a participant by default. 
Diakonia 
Diakonia is a Swedish-based INGO founded in 1966 which works as an umbrella 
organization to disburse and administer funds for SIDA in 34 countries globally, with 400 
separate local partners. The organization is 10 per cent funded through its constituency 
which is made up of five separate Christian denominations. The outstanding 90 per cent 
of the organization's resources are drawn from its partnership with SIDA. The European 
Union also contributes to the occasional project as well. Due to its significant association 
with SIDA, Diakonia's organizational concept is to act as an intermediary between the 
donor and on-the-ground partners throughout the developing world. In collaboration with 
SIDA, Diakonia works to channel funds, technical know-how, and organizational 
capacity to southern based-NGOs. Philosophically, Diakonia maintains a self-stated 
Christian value system, but is also grounded in democratic-socialist theory as evident in 
their mantra, "At Diakonia, we believe in life before death. " (Diakonia - A, 2008) 
Furthermore, and summing up the organization's developmental philosophy is their 
mission statement which asserts, "Diakonia is a Christian development organisation 
working together with local partners for a sustainable change for the most vulnerable 
people of the world." (Diakonia- A, 2008). In terms of implementation, the INGO works 
in five separate sectors: democratization; human rights; social and economic justice; 
gender equality; and peace and reconciliation. 
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In Zambia, Diakonia has been programming since 2003, and partners with eleven 
different development organizations, many of which maintain a strong faith-based 
orientation and include, the Catholic Centre for Justice, Development and Peace 
(CCJDP); the Council of Churches in Zambia (CCZ); CSPR - Society for Poverty 
Reduction; the Jesuit Centre for Theological Reflection (JCTR); the Non Governmental 
Coordinating Council (NGOCC); the Southern African Centre for the Constructive 
Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD); Women for Change; Young Women's Christian 
Association Council of Zambia; and, the Zambia National Women's Lobby Group. The 
organization in Zambia sources contributions from SIDA Headquarters in Stockholm, its 
own regional and global headquarters, as well as the Swedish Embassy in Lusaka. 
Diakonia Zambia's staff consists of four Zambians in total. 
Concerning Diakonia's developmental perspective in the governance and 
democratization sector, the organization affirms that education, advocacy and freedom of 
expression are central to human development. While their website references no 
empirical data to substantiate their programming philosophies, Diakonia's public 
relation's language uses strong and clear text leaving no doubt that democratic theory 
underpins Diakonia's concept of development, 
People must have the opportunity to influence their own lives. That requires 
knowledge and power, but also self-esteem and commitment. Through 
education and organisation, people suffering from poverty, violence and 
oppression can put pressure on decision-makers in different levels of the 
society. (Diakonia - A, 2008) 
Additionally, in their Zambia, 2007, Strategic Plan (Diakonia - B, 2008) the organization 
notes it's own added values in the development process, which, among other items, 
include, a commitment to social justice; equal participation; partnership and networking; 
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a rights based perspective; and experienced staff. The above characteristics are further 
detailed in the document and the interpreted text illustrates the following characteristics 
which coincide with four matrix items found in Appendix I: 6. INGOs frequently exist out 
of genuine compassion and for the betterment of the beneficiary populations they seek to 
serve; 7. Trusted partners; 9. Flexibility and innovation; 10. Build capacity amongst 
target populations; and, 17. As an advocate for policy change within a host country. 
A particularly strong theme within Diakonia literature is that of partnership and 
association. Diakonia stresses the value of partnership and is plain about their perceived 
role within development. That is, Diakonia believes its fundamental role is to assist 
organizations in the developing world do what they feel they need to do, in whatever way 
they need to be assisted, 
We have a living dialogue with our partners. They know what they need on 
the location or level where they work. It is Diakonia's task to provide that and 
help them meet their goals. We can contribute with money, but also with 
capacity building and participation in networks. In short, we want to help our 
partners with whatever they need to help people to achieve a life in dignity, 
with justice and security. (Diakonia - A, 2008) 
One further, final comparative advantage Diakonia might offer is that of item 
number 3. Holding extensive political power within home donor states. With five separate 
Christian denominations in a principally Christian nation,6 the organization no doubt 
holds lobby power in Sweden. As a result, it is in a unique position for an INGO to lobby 
the Swedish Government to support and participate in programmes which Diakonia 
views as important. Due to the above, Diakonia holds political power over one of the 
largest international development donors in the world. The significance of this 
6 The Diakonia consortium of Christian denominations includes, The Swedish Alliance Mission; the Baptist 
Union of Sweden; InterAct; the Methodist Church in Sweden; and, the Mission Covenant Church of 
Sweden. 
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implication is that although dependent on SIDA for regular funding, Diakonia maintains 
'lobbyist sway' in the relationship with its principal patron, and as such may maintain 
some autonomy in programming decisions. 
USAID's History 
Reviewing empirical observations of US AID, a number of consistent behavioural 
patterns persist. Alford points to USAID's record of regularly employing partners -
including NGOs - as means for implementing aid interventions. Interestingly, the 
organization's methodology for programming is, at times, to plan first, and then later 
facilitate partnership. This approach begs the question of how an INGO might maintain 
its own developmental philosophies and autonomy while collaborating with a donor who 
has already designed and blueprinted the programming. (Alford, 2000) 
USAID's reputation for independence when designing programmes can be 
further damaged by American foreign policy which is frequently viewed as an influence 
that regularly steers development interventions. Due to this, USAID is sometimes 
perceived as a disingenuous partner, a frequent stigma amongst implementing partners 
and recipients who interact with the agency. In fact, as a number of countries' 
experiences with American interventionism have been negative, some recipients have 
opted to do without - rather than accept the agency's assistance. An example of this 
exists in the Brazilian women's movement, where greatly needed funding was rejected 
due to the agency's poor reputation, 
Due to the controversial history of the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) in Latin American, many women's groups expressed conflicting feelings 
about accepting the funding proffered by the agency, which had been made 
financially responsible for much of the NGO regional preparatory process. This 
debate became especially heated in the large Brazilian women's movement, where 
USAID funding was eventually turned down. (Friedman, et al., 2001: 24) 
A primary reason for negative reactions to American development programming 
can be traced directly back to USAID's own global history. During the period from post-
World War II, to the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the U.S. Government was involved 
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in numerous geo-political interventions, conflicts or clandestine intercessions. The root of 
these struggles was a war against Soviet and Chinese sponsored communist revolutions. 
These skirmishes were global in presence and included the Korean War, the Vietnam 
War, conflicts throughout Central America and the Caribbean, as well as Afghanistan, 
Eastern Europe, a variety of countries throughout the African continent, and the mid-
East. For many of these interventions, public information on the nation's level of 
involvement was limited. This was especially pertinent as the U.S. Government often 
supported interventions or administrations which the American people might not or 
would not have approved. As a result, it became necessary to utilize creative means in 
which to deliver assistance. One channel for assistance was through the use of 
development funds (Easterly, 2006; Schraeder, et al., 1998.) 
An indication of the effect the Cold War had on American development funding 
is apparent in the changes being seen in aid policy since the end of the Cold War. For 
instance observers, including Easterly, note a shift in the manner of delivery in U.S. 
development funding, a clear signal that policies have changed, 
The US is the only donor with a significant increase in sensitivity to need after the 
Cold War (IDA actually has a puzzling decrease in sensitivity to need after the end 
of the Cold War), which is plausible since the US was the main Western protagonist 
in the Cold War and thus most likely to have used aid politically during the Cold 
War. With the US, the post-Cold War expectations are confirmed, while for IDA and 
the other donors they are not. (Easterly, 2006: 12) 
Nonetheless old habits die hard, and the above should not suggest that U.S. development 
programming has been completely reformed. Security is still an issue that affects 
American development initiatives and the resources which follow. For example in 2002, 
Egypt and Israel accounted for 13 per cent of total US foreign aid disbursements 
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suggesting that foreign policy still dictates at least a portion of development 
programming (Canavire, et al., 2005: 30). 
Outside issues of security U.S. development aid has also been accused of self-
interest from an economic perspective. Tied aid, or the conditions in which aid 
disbursements are economically bound to American interests, continues to be critiqued. 
In response, American policy makers have chosen to ignore their detractors and simply 
stopped reporting information that illuminates the practice (Easterly, 2006). 
Another matter concerning American aid initiatives and economic motivations 
relates to the practice of lobbying. Of interest is how the exercise is used to advocate 
Congress and Presidential administrations for the sole purpose of utilizing aid 
interventions to further business interests. Riddell found that aid lobbyists hold powerful 
sway and indeed use their influence to further American benefit through aid initiatives, 
In the United States, in particular, there is a powerful and growing lobby which is 
arguing that aid should be used exclusively for the purpose of enhancing US trade 
and investment interests. Thus, the Business Alliance for Economic Development 
argued recently that aid should be increased by 50 per cent and used to open up 
markets to US trade and investment, while the Clinton Administration has focused 
increasingly on providing aid to Africa to achieve aims close to this perspective. 
(Riddell, 1999: 320) 
All of the above points to a broader theoretical issue in American aid 
programming, the matter of neo-liberal policies and their sometimes zealous promotion. 
As Fulcher notes, it is neo-liberalism which motivates much of the American global 
exchange, and which has been regularly imposed internationally, 
This movement towards neo-liberal policies has not, however, just happened because 
of the impact of global economic forces. It has been imposed and steered by national 
governments, with their particular national interests and ideologies, and the 
international organizations that represent them. These are dominated by the strongest 
economies, above all the United States, and are therefore agencies of the most 
powerful nation-states. (Fulcher, 2000: 530) 
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And global neo-liberalism is not simply an event which has happened haphazardly. 
Rather it is an executed series of co-optive and/or coercive policies which have been 
implemented through programmes facilitated by American agencies including USAID. 
Some theorists note, including Feldman, that along with the World Bank, USAID has 
been a primary organization in furthering the cause of neo-liberalism and affecting many 
developing countries' economic policies. This has occurred through direct manipulation 
of research, programme design and implementation strategies of USAID (Feldman, 1997) 
American aid strategies have also come under scrutiny for poor operationalization 
methods. Considering USAID's self-stated interests in furthering democracy for example, 
Elinor Ostrom - a long-time USAID democracy consultant, has voiced strong criticism of 
the agency. Her main focus of critique is the agency's facilitation of elections and 
democratic principles in many developing countries. Interestingly though, her critique 
does not focus on American motivation or ideology, but more precisely on the agency's 
rather casual methods of simply going through electoral motions whilst attempting to 
facilitate democracy (Ostrom, 2000; Korten 1980). 
Considering all of the agency's baggage, it is difficult to not conclude that USAID 
and American development initiatives have, periodically, carried a somewhat toxic global 
presence. Nonetheless, U.S. international development programmes are the largest 
development resource allocated globally and so it should come as no surprise that the 
agency is heavily scrutinized and critiqued. With such notable pressures it must be 
wondered whether capacity exists in the agency to programme for the most appropriate 
beneficiaries, in the most appropriate locations, and with the most appropriate partners. 
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USAID and Zambia 
USAID initiated work in Zambia in 1977, and now implements in the sectors of 
Economic Growth - with 20 separate partners in 5 activities; Education - with 4 partners 
and 6 activities; Population Health and Nutrition - with 14 partners and 7 activities; 
HIV/AIDS multisectors - with 15 partners and 9 activities; and, Democracy and 
Governance - with 2 partners and 8 activities. The sum total of USAID's implementation 
in Zambia is currently 35 different activities, with 55 separate programming partners. In 
terms of fiscal assistance, USAID's formal request to the Government of the United 
States of America (USG) for 2008 was a total of over $320 million USD for 
disbursements in Zambia.7 This assistance included, among other initiatives, direct 
budget assistance to the GRZ ($17 million), Child Survival and Health Programmes ($10 
million), and the Global HIV/AIDS Initiative ($290 million). All tolled, the above is a 
component of a larger initiative which has seen USAID's 2008 fiscal disbursements for 
Africa grow by 54 per cent, to an estimated $4.4 billion USD (USAID - B). 
According to their website, USAID's Country Strategic Plan for Zambia for 2004-
2010 is an approach targeted to help assist Zambian challenges and accelerate growth. 
Entitled "Prosperity, Hope and Better Health for Zambians," the programme was 
developed through partnership with the Zambian government, as well as a broad range of 
private sector and civil society stakeholders. The programme's objectives look to 
contribute directly to numerous sectors and cross-cutting areas of the government's 
Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan. These programmes focus on enhancing private sector 
capacities in agriculture and natural resources, improving primary basic education 
7 The USG also delivers in assistance in numerous mediums including the Centre for Infectious Disease 
Control, the State Department, the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief in Africa, and the U.S. 
Army 
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quality, improving the country's health collectively, and holding the Government more 
accountable. The USAID website further declares that the agency 'plans to ensure 
gender-sensitive, people-level improvements, and information and communications 
technology, are incorporated throughout the portfolio.' (USAID - A) However, despite 
USAID's global commitment to ideological underpinnings of supporting democracy and 
private markets, it seems that the agency has dramatically scaled back its democracy 
work in the third world, and is now simply beginning to focus more or less exclusively on 
facilitating private enterprise. In Zambia alone USAID's democracy and governance 
sector programming has almost completely shut down due to marginal resources, while 
the organization's 2009 RFPs are calling for significant private sector development 
components in virtually all sectors including health. 
Thinking of how USAID Zambia conducts its business relationships, the 
organization's global website outlines the very complicated tendering and selection 
process with which all field offices comply. The bulk of the agency's work is executed 
through partnering organizations chosen via competitive procurement processes in line 
with the USG's generalized procurement policy. As noted previously, implementing 
activities are designed specifically to achieve assistance objectives laid out in U.S. 
Assistance Strategies, and only then partners are selected. As noted on the USAID global 
website, 'Infrequently and under limited circumstances, unsolicited proposals are 
funded.' (USAID - C). It should be noted that this protocol is a very different approach 
than a model such as SIDA's, which is more open to unsolicited programming proposals. 
USAID Zambia, and globally, generally outlines programming goals and objectives well 
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before engaging with a partner such as an NGO. 
PACT Zambia 
Pact is a global non-profit corporation founded in 1971. The organization's self-stated 
mission is to 'build strong communities that allow people to earn a dignified living, 
engage in self-help initiatives and participate in democratic life.' (PACT - A). The 
organization is considerable, and presently operates more than 100 programmes in 57 
separate countries, with 25 field offices functioning via 800 staff worldwide, all with an 
estimated budget of $79,000,000 USD for 2006 alone. These programmes focus mainly 
on institution strengthening, capacity building for both community and national 
organizations, and management of funding resources for a long list of international 
development donors (PACT - B). 
PACT'S global mission statement affirms that the organization was founded to, 
'Help build strong communities that provide people with an opportunity to earn a 
dignified living, raise healthy families, and participate in democratic life through, 1) 
strengthening grass-root organizations, coalitions and networks; and, 2) fostering 
meaningful and quality interaction among all sectors of Zambian society to achieve 
social, economic and environmental justice.' The organization's vision is to facilitate a 
'vibrant nation in which relationships of trust and mutual benefit provide the foundation 
and inspiration for a dignified and fulfilling life.' PACT'S website further states that its 
own value system strives for, among other characteristics, participation and 
inclusiveness; a respect for human rights and concern for the marginalized; informality 
and creative freedom; individual autonomy; to build on existing capacity; accountability 
57 
and transparency; and innovation and creativity (PACT - B). A number of these 
characteristics were found in the literature review to be primary strengths of INGOs. 
A second noteworthy feature about PACT is the significant emphasis placed upon 
facilitating civil society through partnership strengthening work, capacity building 
trainings, and general assistance exercises, 
Pact works through and with a broad range of development actors, including 
civil society, government and business to maximize impact and lasting 
change... Pact provides management training, mentoring and grants to local 
NGOs, community organizations, and faith-based organizations providing 
essential social services, elevating the voices of grassroots, and networking 
for greater effectiveness. (PACT - A, 6) 
The organization notes that its motivation for working so closely with local civil society 
is the belief that the third sector is a primary key to building better, responsive and honest 
governments, 'Many emerging civil societies are demanding an end to corruption and 
holding governments to standards of accountability, transparency and effectiveness.' 
(PACT-B). 
Concerning the organization's Zambian field office, PACT Zambia opened in 
Lusaka in July, 1998 in order to implement a US AID project focused at strengthening the 
organizational capacity of selected health, democracy and good governance Zambian 
NGOs. The project specifically targeted work with the Churches Medical Association of 
Zambia, CMAZ (now known as CHAZ) to help the organization redefine and streamline 
its networked services across Zambia, as well as to build financial management capacity 
necessary for the organization to partner directly with US AID. As a result of PACT'S 
work with CHAZ, US AID qualified the organization as a local institution and signed a 
multimillion, multiyear cooperative agreement (Interview: Participant F). It would seem 
that one of PACT Zambia's primary tasks (as well as PACT globally) is to function as a 
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conduit for USAID's funds which are directed at Zambia's grass-roots civil society 
organizations, as well as building capacity and knowledge of their local partners, 
Pact Zambia is a good steward of donor funding with over 8 years of grants 
management experience... Pact awards grants ranging from $5,000 to as 
much as $25,000... Pact's shared values in partnering include active target 
audience and stakeholder (including national and local governmental bodies) 
involvement, building capacity at the grassroots level, strengthening 
community-based networks, and adding to the body of knowledge on 
effective responses through continuous learning and ensuring a results-
oriented focus. (PACT - C) 
Concerning the democracy and governance project discussed for this study, the 
Parliamentary Reform Project (PRP), a programme funded primarily by USAID was 
initiated in September, 2004 and scheduled to conclude October, 2009. However, the 
American Government re-designated Zambia from a 'fragile state' status to 'stabilized' 
and so terminated its democracy and governance programme funding early in October, 
2007. Furthermore, the U.S. Government in fact completely backed out of 
governance/democracy programmes in 2006 globally. During the span of the project 
however, the organization had a total of 11 employees working in the field office, with 
three individuals directly focused on this particular initiative (all Zambian nationals), and 
four more indirectly working as advising and supporting staff (two of whom were 
American expatriates). 
While the $6 million (USD) project had numerous facets, its primary role was to 
support over 30 local NGOs in various methods of advocacy and 'watchdog' capacities, 
who in turn lobbied for a more balanced and decentralized parliamentary system 
(Interview: Participant F). The goals and objectives of the project were ambitious and 
broad, and sought to build governance capacities of the GRZ's ability to operate 
democratically, 
With support from US AID, the National Assembly of Zambia and the 
Parliamentary Working Group of Donors, Pact serves as the executing 
agency of the Parliamentary Reform Project (PRP), initiated to make the 
National Assembly a more accountable, transparent and responsive 
legislative body. The goal of the PRP is a "REAL Parliament for Zambia"— 
a Parliament that is: Representative and Responsive, Efficient and Effective, 
Accountable and Accessible, Legitimate and Linked. (PACT - C) 
According to the US AID global website the project was a success and has had a 
lasting effect in segments of the country. But the website is short on other achievements 
or goals met, 
"The goal is to allow constituents to have increased contact with government 
and increase the power sharing between Parliament and the people... 
Because of the success of this pilot project, fifteen new constituency offices 
will be opened in 2005, providing constituent services to a greater number of 
people across the country." (USAID - A) 
The above calls into question what exactly the long-term goals and objectives of 
such a project might have been. Furthermore, little discussion can be found concerning 
the programme on either PACT's or USAID's website, and despite numerous repeated 
requests to both USAID Zambia and PACT Zambia, no project documentation was 
forwarded. In fact, one programme officer suggested that this documentation might not 
yet even be completed. So it is quite likely that neither PACT nor USAID have any real 
data or substantiated hypothesis on whether their programme met its goals and objectives 
or not. 
Moreover, since the termination of the PRP project, PACT has scaled back its 
programming, and is no longer participating in democracy/governance work in Zambia, 
although the organization continues to function in other sectors of Zambian programme 
delivery (HIV and AIDS). While searching for participants in this study, it was 
discovered that only one remaining employee of the INGO had participated in the PRP 
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programme. However, as of February, 2009, this employee had also left the organization, 






Many of the interview discussions concerning INGO utilization were consistent with the 
generalizations found in the literature. However, a number of assertions found in the 
literature and discussed in the six interviews, were found not to apply to the cases of 
Diakonia/SIDA and PACT/USAID in Zambia. 
All the interview participants believed that development could sometimes be used 
as a tool of foreign policy but none had actual examples to cite. As the Senior SIDA 
Programme Officer put it when referring to foreign aid's potential for interference, 'Yes, 
I think so, but I can't elaborate, but I think there are links. That is the role of the embassy' 
(Interview: Participant B, September 19,2008.) Or, as the Senior US AID Programme 
Officer noted, 'Of course, it's [foreign interests are] the reason why we're 
here.. .Everything we do has 'elements' of self-interest... Not so much on the geo-politics 
however, if so, we would be putting money into infrastructure, rather than HIV and 
AIDS" (Interview: Participant D, September 25,2008). 
Another area where no certain conclusions were met was that of INGOs holding 
political or cultural advantages or disadvantages due to their external, foreign nature. All 
of the participants in the interviews found that INGOs are sometimes perceived as 
outsiders. This could be a positive or negative influence in their ability to programme, 
depending on the many variables at play in each context. As the SIDA Junior Programme 
Officer noted, 'It's a delicate balance. Sometimes you'll find that being a Zambian works 
against you. Sometimes you'll find that being an international is advantageous.' 
(Interview: Participant C, September 22,2008). All of the participants believed that many 
INGOs' local approval is often based on a personality variable within each programme, 
project or organization, and so this factor is not always predictable. 
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Likewise, all the participants believed that INGOs do have a compassionate side 
and do exemplify benevolence, but the interviewees also argued that the organizations 
seek to survive and make a profit of some sort. The US AID Junior Programme Officer 
summed up the group's general sentiments by saying, 'I suppose so [that INGOs exhibit 
benevolent qualities], but it's a business. [INGOs] do have the necessary passion and 
interests, but they do that because they get paid very well.' (Interview: Participant E, 
October 23, 2008.) The Diakonia participant had similar sentiments and did not hesitate 
to dispel any myths about INGOs as solely charitable organizations, 'INGOs have a 
survival instinct as well. At certain times they have to do resource mobilization to 
continue in this thing as well... Yea, not just the needs of the people...' (Interview: 
Participant A, September 16,2008). 
Are INGOs being employed to save fiscal resources, or contracted to deflect 
culpability from developmental programming failures? Although this contention was a 
minor point, the SIDA discussions focused on how the donor relied on Diakonia to find 
local working partners, maintain these relationships, and facilitate programme 
implementation. As the majority of SIDA's on-the-ground programming in democracy 
and governance is implemented through Diakonia it would be fair to argue that the donor 
is in fact outsourcing the bulk of this sector's developmental programming in Zambia. 
SIDA officers also stated explicitly that no SIDA personnel in Zambia had the capacity to 
function in the manner which Diakonia programme officers did, and that SIDA as an 
organization no longer maintained these skill sets in their human resources. 
Fundamentally, the officers wholly agreed that Diakonia was an organization which had 
been overtly outsourced to do work SIDA personnel had traditionally managed, 'We 
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hired Diakonia as they have the means and capacity for organization, administration and 
to channel funds to organizations on the ground - something SIDA could not do.' 
(Interview: Participant C). 
As they have no internal capacity to implement this sector's programming in 
Zambia, SIDA Zambia is clearly reliant on Diakonia for on-the-ground democracy and 
governance programming. Would SIDA Zambia have been better off maintaining their 
own implementation personnel? It remains impossible to know this, but as noted in the 
Contextual Perspectives Chapter (page 36) donors in general have had little success 
programming in Zambia over the past several decades. According to the SIDA 
programme officers, the belief is that SIDA is far too centralized and organizationally 
large to have the sort of impact that Diakonia would have in Zambia, and so the INGO 
added value to their programming. 
INGO advantages 
On a pragmatic level, both USAID and SIDA use their partners mainly as third parties to 
collaborate with government, or as liaisons for working with local partners to funnel 
resources, negotiate relationships and facilitate implementation. Reflecting on these 
relationships, both donor and INGO interview participants noted numerous advantages 
for development programming. The most significant of these advantages stemmed from 
their partner INGOs' efficient and effective business practices which manifested as the 
organization being transparent; having trustworthy reporting standards; faster responses 
to changing requirements; a global network of specialists to call upon; technical 'know 
how'; and other useful business practices. 
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From their perspective, both SIDA programme officers indicated that it is these 
business practices which inspire trust and reliance in partner organizations such as 
Diakonia. They noted that SIDA places significant weight on the ability of Diakonia to 
operate in an efficient business-like manner, and the officers made clear that this 
characteristic was the primary advantage of the relationship, 'We look for organizations 
that have good experience in the developing world, as well as evaluating their 
management structures - ensuring that they are workable. We look for organizations that 
have more linkages/access to resources, networking and technical knowledge in 
comparison to a local organization' (Interview: Participant C). The senior SIDA officer 
expressed similar views in terms of reasons for the donor's dependence on their working 
partner, 
Professionalism! They can offer good technical expertise and capacity not 
found within SIDA. They offer an ability to network internationally. They 
often hold alternative access to information that an embassy might not have -
as well as the ability to express that information... The reporting is 
professional in INGOs... (Interview: Participant B) 
The USAID/PACT participants also strongly agreed with the theme of 
professionalism. In fact, and according to the senior USAID programme officer, not only 
was this professionalism seen as desirable, it often left INGOs as the only clear 
alternative for many of USAID's development programmes when considering choices 
against other options, such as local organizations, 
Every time we put funding into a small, local NGO... Everything about them 
seems to be right, and you put funds into them, I mean even a small amount, 
and you tell them: if you can manage this well, there is more coming... 
Within six months, you're not getting financial reports, and you don't know 
where the money is. It's been mixed with other money here and there, and 
your auditors are saying, 'why did you do that? (Interview: Participant D) 
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So it would seem that the literature's claim of INGOs being a trusted partner is 
valid for these cases, but perhaps not in the original intended manner. Within the 
literature it is implied that INGOs are trusted because of their work with beneficiaries and 
at the grassroots level. In the interviews however, trust was ascribed to strong business 
practices such as reporting capabilities and reliable fiscal procedures. A very different 
scope of trust then hypothesized, but obviously also important. 
Certainly the US AID participants believed that INGOs frequently have proven to 
be more transparent and accountable than host governments; invest far more into their 
infrastructure than local NGOs, who have little capacity to report as donors require; 
implement projects which the private sector do not execute; and also hold capabilities 
that donors such as USAID (and most others), simply cannot have due to a lack of 
bureaucratic capacities, will or expertise. 
So INGOs have indeed created a niche for themselves. And INGOs are trusted 
partners. However, as expressed in all of the interviews, this trust is mainly due to their 
levels of professionalism, financial reporting capabilities, international expertise and 
reputation, rather than an efficiency or capability for working with the poor. In fact, and 
according to the participants, as far as trust on the ground is concerned, INGOs frequently 
have limited exposure to working directly with beneficiaries, and a limited understanding 
of the cultures in which they programme. 
Another area where the participants found INGOs to have programmatic strengths 
concerned their relationship to the host government - the Government of the Republic of 
Zambia (GRZ). In fact, nearly unanimous agreement existed when reflecting on these 
matters. For example, when discussing the concept of whether INGOs and governments 
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had need for each other in general, the junior US AID Programme Officer stated, 1 think 
so, because Government really can't be everywhere and do everything, so why should 
Government fight this...?'(Interview: Participant E). The SIDA counterpart supported 
the opinion, 'I agree [that government and INGOs need each other], there are certain 
things that make INGOs in the best position to advise the GRZ.' (Interview: Participant 
C). Although also in agreement, the senior US AID programme officer did offer a caveat 
to the supposition, suggesting that in spite of the symbiosis, this may not be the most 
beneficial of arrangements for long-term sustainability, 'Yes, of course [INGOs and 
government get along well]... But the fact that we think about them [INGOs] as a 
permanent presence here is a fatal flaw in our perceptions.' (Interview: Participant D). 
The participants also agreed that the INGO/donor relationship was useful as a 
strategy as it combined organizational synergies, and was mutually beneficial. For 
instance, all three SIDA participants felt that the two organizations shared programmatic 
benefits from the relationship which often centered around a willingness to share vital 
information about the Zambian programming environment and about GRZ behaviours in 
particular. As the junior SIDA programming officer put it, 'We realize that NGOs can 
access government ministries in a way we cannot, so we support NGOs to work with 
governments. We do try to support these relationships, it is one of our main dialogue 
issues.' (Interview: Participant C). What was particularly meaningful about this 
collaboration is that the participants stated that information was equally exchanged on a 
mutual basis and so the organizations teamed well to expand their understanding of the 
programming environment and the GRZ's actions. 
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Similarly, whilst speaking to the relationship between USAID and PACT, the 
respective participants generally agreed that the two organizations often partnered well, 
especially while working with government. Again, a major reason for this was the regular 
trade of various levels of information to gain strategic programmatic advantages. The 
senior USAID officer even suggested that facilitating INGOs to work with government 
was a significant component of his job as, and in his opinion, the donor is simply a 
medium for the two with funds to assist, 'The sharing of information between the two 
organizations was a source of advantage, it was not unusual for either the USAID or 
PACT Officers to pick up the phone and exchange notes.' (Interview: Participant D). 
Another useful insight from the interviews was that the donors placed weight on 
INGOs business practices due to a need for an alternative to government and local NGOs 
- for reasons of corruption. Interestingly however, while most of the participants 
suggested that INGOs were valued because government and local partners were often too 
corrupt to responsibly manage SIDA's disbursed funds, the junior SID A programme 
officer intimated that INGOs could be equally as corrupt, but were simply easier to 
monitor due to their strong business practices. According to this participant, the important 
difference is that INGOs' greatest value to donors as partners is the financial 
transparency they offer - not their trustworthiness, a subtle but significantly differing 
point of view. 'Within the GRZ there are a lot of politics involved and corruption yes. It 
is much easier to follow up on [corruption] with an INGO than government as higher 
levels of transparency are prevalent. However, we do realize that corruption can happen 
anywhere.' (Interview: Participant C). 
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In terms of viewing INGOs as a suitable alternative to government, disagreement 
was found between some participants on whether host governments themselves lacked 
the capacity to programme for results, or that the concept of results are just not on the 
GRZ's radar in the first place. As the PACT participant noted, 'No I wouldn't say the 
Government doesn't have the capacity. The NGO works on targets, it has a project and 
the project has an end. Of course there are projects in which the Government also has an 
end, but that culture of the Government is not there.' (Interview: Participant F, November 
6,2008). Whichever is true (undoubtedly a mix of both), it was generally agreed that 
INGOs do programme for, and generally produce better expected results than 
Government, and so add value to developmental programming in their own way. 
Nevertheless, all of the participants interviewed considered INGOs unsustainable and 
only short-term solutions to very long-term problems. Due to these issues of 
sustainability, and in contrast with the literature, the participants felt that development 
INGOs existence is paradoxical (as opposed to emergency oriented INGOs). Nonetheless, 
the participants thought that donors prefer INGOs as alternative partners to Government 
because of corruption and incompetence issues. Governments are still viewed as the long-
term solution to enhanced development in the third world. 
Finally was the matter of INGOs being programmatically valuable as advocates 
for policy change in the country. Critical to this was the unanimous assertion that civil 
society was vital to creating a better government, and that civil society can do things that 
neither Government nor a donor agency has the mandate, legitimacy or political 
capability to do. The SIDA/Diakonia participants all expressed the belief that without an 
agent for facilitation, in this case Diakonia, Zambian civil society would most likely 
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remain stifled or languishing at best. Consequently, the conviction existed amongst the 
participants that the INGO added value to SIDA's development programming and to the 
Zambian political environment in general. 
However, when speaking to INGOs capacity as advocates in Zambia, the USAID 
participants did not agree. The senior USAID officer felt there was a direct conflict of 
interest in contracting an INGO to advocate for change within a country - as that 
organization also requires governmental approval for implementation - as do all USAID 
partners in Zambia. However, the junior programme officer noted that, because of flaws 
within Zambian democracy's evolution, Governmental opposition is frequently 
conducted solely by civil society and NGOs, who are 'more effective in holding 
Government accountable than the official opposition.' (Interview: Participant E). 
Complicating this further are the comments of the PACT programme officer who noted 
that INGOs actually sub-contract and train local NGOs to 'pick up the ball and carry' 
advocacy programmes (Interview: Participant F). 
Nonetheless, all of the participants agreed that at times, donors utilize INGOs as 
an interface for their dialogue with government, and so do act in a particular mode of 
advocacy. To what degree seemed to depend on the sector involved. Education for 
example is more likely to involve a direct donor/Government relationship, but the 
democracy/governance sector is an instance where an INGO might serve as a useful 
buffer between the donor and Government. As one USAID programme officer put it, 
'The host Government will not want a donor to work with the opposition, it will be 
difficult for a bi-lateral to do this.' (Interview: Participant E). So the question of whether 
INGOs do advocacy work well, and so add value to this element of programming, is a 
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complex one. According to the participants, the reality is that INGOs do their best 
advocacy work by training local NGOs to advocate rather than implementing themselves. 
They also further add value by opening dialogue on a given issue with Government - in 
the place of, and on behalf of a donor. 
Finally, INGOs also serve in an advocacy capacity as observers, scrutinizers and 
reporters of Government behaviours. In respect to this last point, the senior SIDA 
programme officer noted succinctly that, 'INGOs serve as an excellent watchdog for 
Government; we certainly could not have that kind of relationship working in an 
embassy.' (Interview: Participant B). 
INGO Disadvantages 
Although discussions with the participants cast INGOs in a generally positive light, 
numerous issues were identified where INGOs were an occasional source of strain on 
development initiatives. The sense of romanticism found in the literature about INGOs 
was, according to these participants, not quite true in reality. For example, numerous 
theorists had suggested that INGOs are well connected to beneficiaries on the ground, 
and have an ability to target poorer populations. Somewhat to the contrary, SIDA 
participants felt that Diakonia was good at targeting partners - who could in turn target 
poorer populations. But a direct linkage between Diakonia and poorer populations was 
not identified, an important distinction according to both of the SIDA officers. When 
considering the relationship between INGOs and the poor more broadly, the SIDA 
participants felt that INGOs generally had difficulty in understanding the Zambian 
context, and so frequently made mistakes early in their programming due to 'being 
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stubborn to the local context' (Interview: Participant C), i.e., seeing themselves as the 
developmental experts and ignoring vital advice on how to proceed locally. Thus 
suggestions that INGOs have the ability to target the poor, may not accurately describe 
actual practices. Diakonia has the ability to partner with organizations who target the 
poor. As the senior SID A participant suggested, 'INGOs are a good tool to reach out, 
channel funds to local organizations - if they have proper links in society.' (Interview: 
Participant B). 
Likewise, according to the American participants, as far as any notion of targeting 
local populations is concerned, INGOs frequently have limited exposure to beneficiaries, 
and a limited understanding of the cultures in which they programme. As the junior 
US AID programme officer put it, 'They do not normally have the necessary local 
knowledge to zero in on the target populations.' (Interview: Participant E). 
In this context, another characteristic which may have been exaggerated in the 
literature are INGOs' flexibility and innovative programming capabilities. When asked 
about the creativity and innovation of their INGO partner - in terms of programming and 
implementation, one participant stated that their partner, Diakonia, had not shown any 
potential for this - mostly due to the fact that they were not encouraged to do so. The 
interviewee noted that in the scope of programming negotiations little room existed for 
innovative programming. Moreover, she was surprised by the thought of an INGO 
offering innovation anyway (Interview: Participant C). 
Similarly, USAID participants did not believe that INGOs demonstrate much 
potential for flexibility and innovation. What was interesting was that they implied that 
these circumstances may be more a case of systemic compliance than the wants or needs 
73 
of an INGO, and noted that it is often the donor funding system which does not allow for 
innovation. Ultimately, the participants unanimously rejected the suggestion that INGOs 
add innovation and flexibility to development programming. As the senior US AID 
programme officer stated, 
No, in fact I see [INGOs] following the curve rather than leading the curve. I 
see very little innovation from INGOs... Like any institution, their 
fundamental reason to exist is, to exist. If you really want to know, go back to 
1992,1993, before PEPFAR, and see how many of those organizations were 
doing HIV and AIDS programmes. Now that we've got billions of dollars 
going to HIV and AIDS, they're all doing it. (Interview: Participant D). 
A third characteristic discussed which conflicts with suggestions found in the 
literature is that of the INGOs ability to build capacity. None of the participants -
including INGO personnel themselves, felt that this was an INGO strength. However, in 
the context of the Paris Agreement, the interviewees concurred that a need for capacity 
building exists and that a definite demand to illustrate more capacity building 
achievements is growing within the development industry. Looking to terminate 
development exercises someday, donors are searching for sustainable programmes - and 
at the heart of this are issues of local capacities. Yet, in an environment where the 
working population is dying at an alarming rate, this is a challenging goal. In Zambia, as 
quickly as capacities can be built, they diminish due to deaths, programme termination or 
human resources poaching. It would seem that INGOs are failing to add capacity building 
value to development programming, but they may not be able to do much about it under 
the current circumstances. As the Diakonia participant noted, 'Some do build capacity, 
but turnover can be high... There is nothing left after a year or two.' (Interview: 
Participant A). 
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A further critique of the Zambian-based INGOs is their conspicuous dependence 
on international donors as a sole means of funding. A clear example of this is the case of 
Diakonia and SIDA. After months of negotiation and planning, SIDA suggested that 
Diakonia prepare for a considerable scale-up of their upcoming five year plan and also 
organize their local partners to do the same. However, weeks before agreements were to 
be signed, SIDA informed Diakonia that they could not support this growth after all and 
were in fact planning to scale back resources in Zambia. As a result the INGO was forced 
to notify local partners of the programming contraction and is now scrambling to locate 
alternative funding resources. Similarly, PACT experienced a crisis when USAID pulled 
their funding unexpectedly leaving the democracy/governance section of the 
organization, and their local partners, essentially terminated. 
Looking to how donors affected INGOs in terms of their ability to produce and 
deliver effective programming, a number of drawbacks surfaced from the interviews. One 
major critique was that, at times, donors coerced their partners into uncomfortable 
programming choices. For example, SIDA had strongly urged Diakonia to participate in 
advocacy campaigns for greater lesbian/gay/bi-sexual (LGB) rights in Zambia. As many 
of their current partners are Christian faith-based organizations (FBOs) who hold 
extremely conservative value systems, Diakonia staff were resistant to participation in 
such a programme and the result has been tensions amongst the various levels of 
partnership. According to the Diakonia participant, the differences of opinion have also 
served to alienate the organization's very conservative grassroots partners. Despite the 
worthiness of such a cause, under the current conservative political and cultural climate 
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in Zambia it is inconceivable how the endorsement of such a wholly unpopular advocacy 
campaign could be effectively pursued in Zambia by Diakonia. 
Moreover, this corresponds with accusations that INGOs are sometimes more 
accountable to their donors than beneficiaries. The Diakonia Country Representative 
concurred with this and went on to discuss how the organization's loyalties could 
occasionally be divided between commitments to their on-the-ground partners and 
satisfying their donor's expectations: 
'Sometimes... Definitely. For us it hasn't been very difficult, but sometimes 
we have to bend a bit. We tell our partners that they should stand by their 
programmes, not because of funding. At other times we really have to justify, 
to maintain our money requirement... We need funding to continue our 
programmes.' (Interview, Participant A) 
Nonetheless, the participant downplayed these tensions and noted that SIDA as a donor 
was generally flexible enough to negate the differences and cited only the inclusion of 
LGB advocacy programmes as a source of relationship strain. 
However, amongst the USAID participants the perception exists that INGOs are in 
fact most accountable to neither their donors nor beneficiaries but rather see themselves 
as the primary recipient of consideration. As the senior USAID programme officer noted 
tersely, 'INGOs can utilize donor funding to build their own capacity, rather than 
focusing on getting the job done... [they are] much more focused on their long-term 
[organizational] health, this is in direct contradiction to a private organization who is 
usually much more efficient in their delivery...' (Interview: Participant D). Furthermore, 
the PACT programme officer essentially agreed and noted that, 'INGOs have a survival 
instinct as well. At certain times they have to do resource mobilization to continue in this 
thing.' (Interview: Participant F). 
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Another issue which suggests that INGOs may not only be failing to add value, 
but which might even be diminishing the effectiveness of their development 
programming is that of resource distribution. In fact, all of the participants held INGOs 
partially responsible for Government's fiscal inability to meet programming needs. One 
USAID officer pointed out that an INGO which receives a $50 million grant will often 
spend 40 to 60 per cent of the funding internally. The argument is that if this funding was 
simply sourced directly to government it would have a far more direct application to the 
developmental problem - and Government would have more reasonable funding to work 
with. This is an ironic twist to the literature's findings that INGOs are useful because 
many developing world governments cannot afford to maintain their programmes. 
A final critique of INGOs was that the organizations did not hold any potential for 
macro-scale positive change. Interestingly, this view was held despite the fact that the 
participants generally agreed that in the democracy/governance sector the potential for 
immense impact did exist. The critique however, was not levelled at whether most of 
mainstream Zambia could be immediately affected by these programmes but rather 
whether there was the potential for sustainability of these exercises. As the senior USAID 
programme officer stated while speaking to INGOs' thoughts on sustainability, 'No, it's 
not even on their agendas.' (Interview: Participant D). 
Thinking of even the most successful countries' histories with democracy and 
governance, it is clear a long-term commitment is a significant requirement. Considering 
the U.S. and Swedish Governments have dramatically scaled back their funding for such 
programmes, it must be wondered if these initiatives have or will affect long-term macro-
scale change. If not, the programming value would most likely be virtually nil. 
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Nonetheless, several of the participants suggested that it is the collective effort, 
over a very long period of time, which will begin to show impacts. And this is not 
something any one organization or relationship can do on its own. Despite realistic 
cynicism, the majority of the participants held guarded hope that their programming was 
contributing to a better Zambian future, 'In the areas we work in we can see these issues 
being talked about in Zambian society now, on the radio or talk shows, so yes, these 





Revisiting the original hypothesis of whether INGOs add value to development 
programming as a number of researchers suggest, the conclusions which may be drawn 
from this study suggests that yes, the organizations surveyed generally do add value. In 
concert with the above, the study's literature review noted numerous, valuable INGO 
qualities, and a great deal of truth exists in these sentiments. But as often is the case when 
comparing the written word against practice, a disconnect exists. For example, although 
INGOs were found to be generally trustworthy, the interviews made clear that it was 
donors rather than beneficiaries who had placed significant trust in the organizations. 
And this was much more due to their transparent business practices rather than a 
particularly close link to the poor. In fact, and as suggested by several study participants, 
INGOs have very little connection with beneficiaries whatsoever. Something not at all 
considered in the literature. 
A second positive trait INGOs were found to have was an uncanny ability to act in the 
various roles required, as required. INGOs were happy to be seen as collaborators, 
convenors, or even culprits if necessary. While it could be argued the above implies the 
poor character of organizations willing to do what it takes to continue funding, it may 
also speak to the flexibility also mentioned in the literature review. If true, this again 
suggests how attitudes about INGOs remain generally true, but perhaps less than 
accurate. Whichever the case, INGOs clearly have a role to play as mediator between 
various actors in development processes. 
Another beneficial characteristic about INGOs was their role as advocate and 
watchdog. However, it would be fair to say that this function is also somewhat 
misconstrued when comparing theory against practice. In the literature there is an 
80 
implication of organizations who are strong willed, with loud voice and ready to critique. 
The reality is very different. The INGOs reviewed in this study do advocate and do 
support those who speak out. But their advocacy is enacted behind closed doors and is 
much more a gentle hand than a loud shout. It is doubtful they would retain any funders if 
they did much more than this. 
Finally, is the reality that INGOs can simply implement tasks where no other agent 
has the ability, interest or mandate. And in this case, the literature was accurate. INGOs 
have very much carved a niche for themselves. Few local organizations have the 
reporting capacities to operate implement a project that most international donors require; 
no private firm would have the interest to involve themselves as deeply as an INGO; no 
donor has the will or political flexibility to do so; while government has not shown the 
capacity to do so. Only INGOs have solutions to fill gaps as they appear in development 
programming. 
Have the INGOs lost their autonomy? 
However, the study's original hypothesis also suggested that INGOs also pay a very real 
price for their specialized role in development programming. The INGOs in this study 
(and no doubt the majority of INGOs) are thoroughly dependent on donor support. As a 
result, these organizations retained limited autonomy and held very real obligations. In 
the case of US AID, this must certainly be true as the donor had fully designed the 
programme even before it looked to hire its partner. In the SIDA example, subtle pressure 
had been applied to their partner for compliance with the very unpopular LGB advocacy 
programme. More appreciably however, one organization closed its governance and 
81 
democratization programming as soon as donor funding was terminated and the other is 
near doing the same. These INGOs are undoubtedly extensions of donor programming. 
The above also demonstrates how an INGO can undermine the organic nature of 
civil society and create artificial environments. If Diakonia or PACT were not entirely 
dependent on their donors for funding, their own Zambian partners might be better 
prepared to generate diversified, self-sufficient resources - rather than relying on external 
actors for support. As a great deal of Zambian democracy and governance civil society 
has come to depend on donor resources, dependency issues clearly affect their behaviour. 
These circumstances illustrate the potential for long-term injury and may set this sector 
back for a decade. In this example, INGO (and donor) involvement in democracy and 
governance programming may have proven a detriment and have been a disruptive 
energy in the country. 
In line with these sentiments, INGOs remain unsustainable and draw valuable funds 
away from a host government - in this case the GRZ, the most likely long-term solution 
to development in Zambia. While an INGO might achieve goals and objectives with 
military efficiency over a five-year programme, the questions remains of what will 
happen in the sixth year. For better or worse, the GRZ remains the default solution to 
Zambia's developmental problems. 
Another critical assessment was aimed at INGOs reputations. According to the 
participants in this study, INGOs do not connect with beneficiaries on the ground; do not 
display any flexibility or innovation; and do not tend to build long-term capacity. In fact 
none of their programmes showed any effort at meeting these needs whatsoever. 
Moreover, the participants seemed surprised that any of the above might be considered 
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INGO strengths. These characteristics were simply not considered to be a part of an 
INGO's personality. 
Finally was the issue of how INGOs are sometimes perceived to be a magic bullet 
to all developmental problems. In agreement with the rest of his donor colleagues 
interviewed, the junior USAID officer said that donors do often utilize INGOs in a 'one-
size-fits-all approach.' (Interview: Participant E). Interestingly the literature implies that 
it is the donors who frequently view INGOs as a panacea, but the USAID participant 
suggested that it is the INGOs who tout themselves as holding solutions to all troubles. 
Both scenarios appear to be exaggerations. INGOs cannot add value to programming 
without an accordingly suitable assessment of what the problem might be, as well as what 
the organization can do to solve this issue. 
A final set of conclusions deals with a number of hypotheses about INGO 
behaviour that ultimately proved inconclusive. The participants and the subsequent data 
they provided were unconvincing about foreign policy as an interference in development 
programming. Likewise, thoughts on INGO motivations and whether their compassion 
was a factor in programming were also questionable. Unanimously, all of the participants 
affirmed that INGOs are compassionate, but that this was irrelevant as they still operate 
much like businesses. 
Subsequently, the above conclusions find INGOs imperfect, but filling a glaring 
niche in development interventions which no other organizations can do at this time - for 
better or worse. Nonetheless, these entities are also a long way from the concept that 
originally construed them. Global civil society has become a hybrid business of sorts and 
should be treated as such. To think otherwise would be naive. 
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Recommendations 
After reviewing the study and taking into considering the political and organizational 
realities of INGOs and donors in the field, a number of potential actions surfaced which 
could be taken to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of these organizations in 
development programming. One step is for donors to shelter programming funds set aside 
for programming agreements, and stick to the spirit of these contracts. By behaving 
inconsistently and stepping in and out of projects as they see fit - and in an unpredictable 
or accountable manner, donors create chaos in programming sectors. The last thing 
Zambian civil society or Government needs are fickle and incoherent friends. 
Another suggestion for improvement, and in line for the above, is that INGOs also 
need to be evaluated on their own long-term commitment to countries and sectors in 
which they programme. Much like donors, INGOs seem to move quickly in and out of 
programming environments as they see fit. While this is no doubt within their discretion, 
international donors should be using global assessments of international non-
governmental organizations. If INGOs wish to pick up and chase funding rather than 
illustrating long-term commitment to populations and programmes, they should be 
treated solely as businesses and held to the same criteria. INGOs currently enjoy both 
faces of the coin as professional organizations with benevolent faces. Yet these separate 
sides carry very different responsibilities and privileges. INGOs have enjoyed these 
privileges for a very long time, at some point these organizations will need to face up to 
the complimentary responsibilities and be accountable for long-term development. 
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Lastly, INGOs must find ways to cut through the politics of development. These 
organizations sell themselves as advocates for the poor and vulnerable, but are sometimes 
shockingly quiet when they are most needed. Currently, the critical flaw in international 
development programming is that too many programmes, organizations and policies 
continue to be unaccountable - both in the developing world and outside of it. Donors, 
host governments and international agencies need to be confronted with this reality, both 
internationally and domestically. Until this happens, the status quo will remain. 
A final word 
Finally, several outstanding issues in this study should be resolved. To begin with, it is 
essential to state that the data and interviews collected are mere snapshots of a sub-
component of Zambian civil society - in the governance and democracy sector. And this 
assertion speaks evermore when commenting on Zambia's third sector in all of its 
immense entirety, let alone the global development industry. Six interviews, a brief 
review of two donors and their public policies, as well as a summarized literature review 
barely scratch the surface of INGO's generalized contributions to development 
programming globally, or even just in Zambia alone. 
Yet, it is important to note that these interviews do offer over 80 years of 
professional experience and opinions, and were given by six central personalities in the 
Zambian democracy and governance sectors - all of whom are acutely involved in the 
country's democratic and governance reform process. Their commentary provides at least 
anecdotal evidence of patterns in Zambia. Does the data collected in this review provide 
insurmountable evidence as to INGOs value in development programming? No, of course 
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not. Do these stories suggest clues as to what might be expected when theorizing the 
relationship between donors and INGOs, and more importantly, INGOs and development 
programming in Zambia? Perhaps. 
However, in order to further strengthen findings on INGOs numerous next steps 
for research exist. For example, what might be useful for further action would be to 
evaluate the relationship each INGO holds with its local partners as it takes on the role of 
donor itself. It might also be interesting to ascertain what will happen to each INGO's 
programmes, as well as their local partners, as democracy and governance funding 
continues to erode. Furthermore, an evaluation of the local, partner organizations 'on-the-
ground' programming would also add substantial insight to how each actor truly affects 
Zambian development. What might additionally be useful for further inquiry would be a 
closer study of how donors and INGOs continue to scrutinize their own programming. In 
fact what was particularly striking about this study was how little donors, INGOs or the 
development industry are really scrutinized at all. 
For example, despite claims of transparency and ease of access to information in each 
of their global websites, detailed information for any of the programmes in this study 
remained very difficult to obtain. Particularly in the case of US AID and PACT, no annual 
o 
report, country report or programme report was available despite numerously repeated 
requests (and assurances) for this information. This is especially troubling considering the 
project was a multi-million dollar programme which was terminated early, and has now 
been closed for well over a year. 
USAID does provide Zambia Annual Reports for up to 2006 on their global website, but nothing for 
thereafter. 
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Speaking more generally, regardless of the massive efforts given in researching 
international development initiatives, it would seem that only a small portion of 
researchers are currently digging into how the industry actually operates from a nuts and 
bolts perspective. In comparing data from the literature review against what was found in 
the field, it became obvious that researchers often have a very limited understanding as to 
how the industry currently functions. An ironic twist considering the enormous amounts 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix 2: Summary of statements about INGO/donor relationships and 
behaviour 
INGOs retain a distinct, external visage 
amongst marginalized groups in 
developing countries 
Alger; Werker and Ahmed 
Very differently linked to the tribal, ethnic 
or political environments of the beneficiary 




Hold extensive political power within home 
donor states 
Olsen, Hoyen & Carstensen; Zinnes and 
Bell; Raustiala; Streeten 
Some of the largest INGOs' global budgets 
may be relatively equal to or greater than 
many smaller donor agencies 
Friedman, Hochstetler & Clark; Robinson; 
Mundy & Murphy; Alger; Friedman, et. 
AL; Postma; Keck and Sikkink 
In short, no one simple label or set of 
correlating hypothesis may be fit to 
describe the INGO universe. Nonetheless, 
several frequent patterns do exist 
Streeten 
INGOs frequently exist out of genuine 
compassion and for the betterment of the 
beneficiary populations they seek to serve 
Fulcher; Brinkerhoff and Costen; 
Raustiala; Brinkerhoff, J.; Tvedt; Fisher; 
Candler; Werker and Ahmed; Sanyal 
Trusted partners Tvedt; Fisher; Raustiala 
Ability to target poor populations Hyden; Chambers; Gran; Fisher; Finkel; 
Mequanent; Galvin and Habib; Werker and 
Ahmed; Riddell; Korten; Sanyal 
• Flexibility and innovation Murphy and Mundy; Streeten; Gran; Fulcher; Takao; Alger; Sanyal 
Build capacity amongst target populations Postma; Fisher; Martinussen; Finkel 
INGOs have, at times, been proven to offer 
'comparative advantage' to development 
programming 
Brinkerhoff J.; Werker and Ahmed; Sanyal 
12 Alternative to corrupt government Riddell; McAuslan; Werker and Ahmed; 
Alford 
13 Many developing country governments 
simply do not yet have the capacity or 
political will to maintain service delivery 
Postma; Hammergren 
14 Government's fiscal resources for service 
delivery are often not adequate to run even 
the most austere of programmes 
Brinkerhoff and Costen 
15 Developing country governments and 
INGOs do frequently have real need for 
each other 
Brinkerhoff J.; Riddell; Raustiala; Sanyal 
16 Donors facilitate cohesion between 
governments and NGOs 
Brinkerhoff J. 
17 As an advocate for policy change within a 
host country; or as a 'counterweight' to an 
unreceptive government 
Robinson; Brinkerhoff and Costen; 












^ • ) 
M.-r: 
Donors may view NGOs as an alternative 
partner while working in a state which has 
an ineffectual, belligerent or even hostile 
government 
Aid is a tool for the furthering of any given 
donor country's particular interests 
Small or middle power states hold a 
reputation of awarding and programming 
for a benevolent rationale 
Funds are channelled to INGOs who 
participate in subversive activities, such as 
raising support for friendly opposition 
parties and civil society, or acting as 
agitators to disquiet a targeted government 
Direct funding to INGOs and other civil 
society groups who work to replace or 
replicate faltering social services in a state 
being encouraged to downsize their own 
service delivery 
Few NGOs have the capacity, resources or 
political clout to implement the macro-
scaled programmes required for 
substantial, sustainable, state change 
INGOs are being employed to save fiscal 
resources, as well as to deflect culpability 
from developmental programming failures, 
and are frequently not as effective as 
donors often suggest 
Potential for an INGO to be acting from a 
politically uninformed vantage point, often 
due to a lack of immersion within the 
society they programme in 
Donor involvement - through INGOs - in 
local civil society, can disturb the organic 
composition of the civil environment by 
providing artificial incentives, suggesting 
artificial desires, and creating an artificial 
sphere in which organizations could/would 
otherwise differently grow 
INGOs are often considered a magic bullet, 
which can mend all predicaments with 
their particular solution 
Donors are under enormous pressure to 
disburse large sums of fiscal resources 
INGOs are accountable only to their 
donors, but not often accountable to their 
beneficiaries 
NGOs feel that they trade information and 
expertise for the dubious prestige of being 
on a list of selected consultants 
Robinson; Brinkerhoff and Costen; 
Fulcher; Werker and Ahmed 
Schraeder, et Al.; Boone; Bourguignon and 
Sundberg; Mondlane; Alesina and Weder; 
Svensson 
Olson, et AL; Schraeder, et Al, 
Tvedt; O'Brien; Feldman; Alford 
Feldman; Igoe; Takao; Werker and 
Ahmed; Fulcher 
Korten; Van de Walle; Takao; Sanyal 
Van de Walle; Werker and Ahmed; 
Hammergren 
Young 
Igoe; Feldman; Ohayo 
Igoe; Vivan; Tendler 
Tendler; Hammergren; Igoe; Van de Walle 
Werker and Ahmed; Yasuo; Hammergren; 
de Waal; Igoe 
Skjelsbaek 
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Appendix 3: Questionnaire 
INFORMED VERBAL CONSENT 
To be read prior to the interview 
I am a graduate student in the Department of International Development Studies at Saint Mary's 
University. As part of my masters/honours thesis, I am conducting research under the supervision of Dr. 
John Devlin, and I am inviting you to participate in my study. 
The purpose of the study is to examine the value and role which international non-governmental 
organizations (INGOs) play in implementing donor countries' development programming initiatives in 
developing countries, particularly Zambia. As a result, the study will conduct a comparative analysis 
between several donors, including their field-offices, and their perspectives on outsourcing/working with 
INGOs. The study will further evaluate the relationship between donors, INGOs and beneficiaries. 
This study will be conducted through four separate means. The first component will evaluate development 
literature concerning INGOs and compile a list of theory which suggests typical behaviour. The second 
component will be an evaluation of both donors and INGO collateral material in order to better understand 
what each organization communicates about its initiatives. The third component will comprise of 
distribution of three separate questionnaires to donors, INGOs and beneficiaries. The fourth component 
will be comprised of follow-up interviews based on survey results, with four being conducted with 
donor programme officers, and four being conducted with INGO programme officers. I wish to initiate 
one of these interviews with you now. 
Your participation is completely voluntary. You may withdraw from this study at any time without penalty. 
Are you completely comfortable with participating in this interview? 
All information obtained in this study will be kept strictly confidential and anonymous if so desired. If 
you wish to remain anonymous, Please do not put any identifying information on any of the forms. To 
protect individual identities, this consent form will be sealed in an envelope and stored separately. 
Furthermore, the results of this study will be presented as a group and no individual participants will be 
identified. 
If you have any questions, please contact Glenn Shaw, the principal researcher, at 0979 485308, 
gshaw90@hotmail.com; or Dr. John Devlin, Research Supervisor, at 519 824 4120, jdevlin@uoguelph.ca 
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board. If 
you have any questions or concerns about the study, you may contact Dr. Veronica Stinson, Chair of the 
Saint Mary's University Research Ethics Board at etnics@smu.ca or 011 920 420-5728. 
By signing this consent form, you are indicating that you fully understand the above 
information and agree to participate in this study. 
Participant's Signature: Date: 
Please keep one copy of this form for your own records. 
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1. Please tell me about the work you do with International Non-governmental 
Organizations (INGOs)? Please discuss how many you work with; how much you 
spend with them every year; how you programme with them; how you monitor 
and evaluate them; etc... Please be as detailed as possible. 
2. What are the specific aims and priorities of your organization in this sector, 
globally? Please be as detailed as possible. 
3. What are the specific aims and priorities of your organization in this sector, in 
Zambia? Please be as detailed as possible. 
4. Can you discuss the top attributes 'your organization/you' look for when 
partnering with an INGO? Please be as detailed as possible. 
5. Can you difficulties 'your organization/you' have encountered when partnering 
with INGOs? Please be as detailed as possible. 
6. I would like to discuss some of the following thoughts about INGOs. Please offer 
your thoughts on the following perceived INGO characteristics. 
1) INGOs generally exist out of genuine compassion and for the betterment 
of the beneficiaries they seek to serve 
2) INGOs are generally trusted partners 
3) INGOs have an ability to target poor populations 
4) INGOs are flexible and innovative 
5) INGOs build capacity amongst target populations 
6) INGOs offer 'comparative advantage' to development programming 
7. I would like to discuss some of the following thoughts about INGOs and 
Government. Please offer your thoughts on the following perceived 
INGO/Government relationship characteristics. 
1) INGOs are useful partners and a good alternative to Government 
2) INGOs are useful as Government does not have the capacity to 
programme for your sector 
3) INGOs are useful as Government resources for service delivery are often 
not adequate to run most programmes 
4) Developing country Governments and INGOs do frequently have real 
need for each other 
5) Your organization works to facilitate cohesion between Government and 
INGOs 
8. As an officer for a donor development agency, do you feel that development has 
any relationship international trade policy; geo-politics; or the general interests of 
your home country? Please be as detailed as possible. 
9. Do any of the INGOs that you work with have the capacity to affect macro-scale 
change in Zambia? Please explain who and how in detail. 
10. How do you monitor and evaluate your INGO partners? Please explain in detail. 
11. How are your top INGO partners selected to partner with, and does your 
organization work in the same capacity and at the same scale with local NGO(s)? 
12. Do you feel your INGO partners are effective in the tasks they are mandated to 
do, and why do you think this? 
13. Did your sector of your organization have a difficult time disbursing funds last 
year? If so, why? If not, why? Please explain in detail. 
14. Where and how are your programming strategies designed? Please indicate 
exactly who is involved in this process, i.e. are they in-country, or within your 
organization, or with your embassy? Please explain in detail. 
15. Are you given written material(s) which assist in guiding you in your sectoral 
programme design, if so, do you find these materials to be effective tools? Can 
you list and/or forward these materials? 
16. Are any of your INGO partners consulted when designing programmes? If so, 
please explain who and how they are consulted or contribute to the process of 
design. 
17. Do any of the INGOs you partner with work at an advocacy level in order to 
affect Government programming/service delivery/the political environment? Do 
you feel they are effective in this role? Do you assist them with this? 
18. Do you have any further thoughts on your organization and their 
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